The Stanford Ponzi Scheme: The Whistleblower’s View

"In August 1997, I assigned an experienced and highly skilled examiner to go to Houston to analyze Stanford’s revenue stream, its methods of product distribution, and its sales practices. In only a week the examiner was able to collect enough evidence to suggest that Stanford was engaged in a fraudulent scheme – most likely a Ponzi scheme. Our conclusion was based on a significant capital infusion of funds into the broker-dealer, the source of which appeared to be investor funds. We also noted apparent misrepresentations regarding the safety and security of the investments. It was highly unlikely that the high returns being paid to investors from the CDs along with the high recurring referral fees being paid to Stanford’s broker-dealer could be generated without engaging in significant risk."

Julie Preuitt

by Julie Preuitt, Fort Worth Regional Office
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, Committee on Financial Services, U.S. House of Representatives

May 13, 2011

Introduction

Thank you for the opportunity to testify before this subcommittee with respect to my work for the Securities & Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) as it relates to R. Allen Stanford and his affiliated companies as well as my experience as a whistleblower within the Commission. Since 1992 I have been employed by the Commission in its Fort Worth office. In my testimony I am stating my personal views which do not necessarily reflect the views of Commission staff, the Commission, or its Commissioners.

My Role with the Commission

I would like to begin my testimony by explaining my role at the Commission. Starting as a staff accountant my duties were to conduct examinations of registered broker-dealers and transfer agents. The examinations were designed to determine the registrants’ compliance with the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, with particular emphasis on the anti-fraud provisions. I became a first line supervisor (branch chief) in 1997, where I became deeply involved in making many of the decisions regarding the direction of the Fort Worth broker-dealer examination program. In 2003 I was promoted to an assistant director position where I became responsible for running the broker-dealer program. In that role two first line supervisors as well as nine examination staff and one support person reported to me.

The Stanford Examinations

First, I would like to note that I am just a representative of the many highly experienced and skilled examiners who have done their best to protect all investors including those defrauded by Stanford. I know this may not provide comfort and certainly doesn’t lessen the Stanford victims’ losses in any way, but I and the examination staff truly care about being an advocate for the investor. Behind the public, impersonal face of a large institution like the SEC are many individuals that truly mourn your loss.



The intertwining of my career with Stanford started simply enough. In August 1997, I had just been promoted to the position of first line supervisor. One of my responsibilities was to select broker-dealers in the Fort Worth Region for examination. In an effort to familiarize myself with the registrants and to target high risk firms for examination, I began by reviewing the annual filings required by all registered broker-dealers. Stanford’s filings immediately stood out in the review process because the firm was generating millions of dollars in revenue although it had only been in existence for two years. Furthermore, the firm had generated all of the revenue by engaging in a business model which typically offered very little revenue – selling certificates of deposit (CDs). In a more typical situation at the time, a broker-dealer would receive perhaps $50 to $100 for the sale or referral of a CD.



In August 1997, I assigned an experienced and highly skilled examiner to go to Houston to analyze Stanford’s revenue stream, its methods of product distribution, and its sales practices. In only a week the examiner was able to collect enough evidence to suggest that Stanford was engaged in a fraudulent scheme – most likely a Ponzi scheme. Our conclusion was based on a significant capital infusion of funds into the broker-dealer, the source of which appeared to be investor funds. We also noted apparent misrepresentations regarding the safety and security of the investments. It was highly unlikely that the high returns being paid to investors from the CDs along with the high recurring referral fees being paid to Stanford’s broker-dealer could be generated without engaging in significant risk.



Before the end of September 1997, we reported our findings to enforcement in the Fort Worth office. Although the examiner, the associate regional director and I were anxious to get enforcement to act on our concerns, we were met with little enthusiasm. By January of 1998, when the associate regional director retired, we had yet to persuade enforcement to open an investigation. However, before the associate regional director left the Commission, she repeatedly reiterated her concerns to both the examination and enforcement staff. She also encouraged me to keep fighting for the Stanford investors.



In May 1998, after receiving an inquiry from another agency regarding Stanford’s activities, enforcement decided to open a preliminary investigation. Then, in June of that same year, Fort Worth’s investment advisory examination group started an examination of Stanford to, in part, follow up on the broker-dealer examination findings. By the beginning of July the investment advisory group also had substantial concerns regarding Stanford’s business model.



In July of 1998, I was summoned to the office of the associate director for enforcement for a meeting. I recall that he discussed some of the reasons why a decision had been made to close the investigation, but I don’t recall what any of those reasons were. Unfortunately, my clearest memory of that meeting is leaving his office feeling absolutely heartsick.



In November of 2002, the investment advisory examination group again conducted an examination of Stanford. The group found significant problems at the firm including failing to meet its fiduciary duty to clients. As I had in 1998, I was involved in multiple discussions with the investment advisory lead examiner about how obvious the fraudulent scheme seemed to be, but how difficult it seemed to get action from enforcement regarding this particular set of circumstances. In fact, rather than opening an investigation, enforcement advised the investment advisory examination group that it would be referring their findings to the Texas State Securities Board. I was disappointed in enforcement’s decision. It made no sense to me that enforcement would refer such a complicated scheme to an agency which had a far more limited jurisdictional reach.



In approximately September of 2004, the associate director for examinations asked me to make Stanford an examination priority. This was the same associate director for examinations who was in place at the time of the 2002 examination program and he was gravely concerned about Stanford’s activities. I considered this assignment to be a tremendous challenge. I had no doubt that we would find numerous indicia of fraud, but I was extremely concerned about how I could convince the same associate director of enforcement, who had declined to investigate Stanford three times earlier, that there was any reason to pursue an investigation this time? However, we both concluded that my concerns were trivial compared to our mission to protect the investing public.



In October 2004, two examiners who I considered to be some of the best in the Commission went to Houston and began another examination. Meanwhile, an attorney advisor assigned to the examination staff and I began to develop alternate strategies to pursuing the investigation so that we could overcome any previous objections raised by enforcement staff. Since we could not gain access to financial records held in a foreign country, we worked with examiners to develop objective analytical methods to demonstrate what we believed to be the impossibility of Stanford’s purported returns.



In March of 2005, as we were nearing completion of the examination, a summary of our findings and conclusions were presented at a regional regulators’ meeting. The immediate reaction from both the Fort Worth regional director and the associate director for enforcement was decidedly negative.



Around the time of this fourth unofficial declination to pursue an enforcement investigation, the associate director for enforcement announced his imminent departure from the Commission. I decided that the best course of action was to wait until he departed the Commission to officially refer our findings.

Opening the Stanford Investigation

Within two or three weeks of the just mentioned meeting, when the associate director for enforcement departed, I referred the examination to an assistant director in enforcement who I believed would be more likely to tackle an investigation into Stanford. The assistant director immediately responded to the referral; however, he too, was also soon departing the Commission so it was referred to another assistant director in enforcement. The new assistant director initially reacted with great enthusiasm and even considered filing an emergency court action which would halt the apparent fraud immediately. However, he soon took on a much more negative view of the facts and circumstances. Eventually, enforcement asked us to refer the case to the self-regulatory organization FINRA. Although we complied with the request, we remained undaunted in our determination to move Stanford forward into an SEC investigation. Just as in the case of the referral to the Texas State Securities Board, it seemed difficult to imagine that an agency with a smaller jurisdictional net could be as well-equipped as the SEC to tackle such a significant investigation. We continued to work on developing legal theories and case strategies. Despite our efforts, in approximately October of 2005, the assistant director announced his decision to close what had been up to now only an informal, or preliminary, investigation.



I did not accept his decision. I implored the new acting regional director of the Fort Worth office as well as the new head of enforcement to keep the investigation open and moving forward. It was agreed that I and the assistant director of enforcement would each prepare a memo explaining our opposing viewpoints and discuss them at a meeting. I’d like to believe that I wrote a very compelling memo and that is why it was ultimately decided to keep the case open, but the truth is that where there are that many indications of fraud, it is easy to be persuasive.



It should be noted that despite the decision to move forward with the investigation, it took another eleven months with little activity occurring on the investigation before a formal investigation was finally opened.

Institutional Influences Affecting the Stanford Investigation

Before I discuss my views on the causes for the long delay of the Stanford investigation I want to take a moment to express my personal admiration for the enforcement staff members who were able to overcome significant obstacles and obtain the critical evidence necessary to bring an action against R. Allen Stanford and his companies. Their hard work has continued in both the current litigation and in efforts to build cases against others involved in the Stanford fraud. It would be difficult to imagine a more talented or dedicated group of professionals. I believe that the public is well-served by having such individuals devote their life’s work to investor protection.



Much has been made of the former SEC-wide institutional influence that created an institutional bias against matters that were resource intensive and whose outcome was less than certain. Stanford was such a matter. There is no question that during the early Stanford timeframe, the Fort Worth office’s management firmly believed that the office’s success was measured strictly by the number of cases filed each year. Additionally, In Fort Worth, “beating” other offices by filing a greater number of cases was the highest goal. That is not to say that the Fort Worth staff did not bring meaningful cases; they did, and they should be credited for doing so. A prime example is the office’s 2002 case against a Houston energy company, Dynegy Inc., for accounting improprieties involving special-purpose entities and “round-trip” or “wash” trades. Another example is the office’s 2004 enforcement action against foreign-based oil companies Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and The “Shell” Transport and Trading Company, p.l.c., in connection with their overstatement of 4.47 billion barrels of hydrocarbon reserves. The companies paid a $120 million penalty.



The good news is that things are changing. In that regard, I want to commend Mr. Khuzami’s recognition that the evaluation of an office’s performance should include factors such as the quality, difficulty and programmatic significance of cases; the consideration of “quantity” has been placed in proper perspective. This can only encourage management decisions to be aligned with the public good.



I also want to express my appreciation to Mr. Khuzami for publicly acknowledging that the Commission could have taken a more imaginative approach to investigating Stanford. I urge Mr. Khuzami to carry that sentiment forward in the Commission’s approach to investigating other novel situations. A culture that has greater appreciation for thinking “outside the box” will well serve the interests of investors.

Raising Concerns about a “Quick-Hit” Mentality in Examinations

Unfortunately, the mentality that motivated managers in Fort Worth to sometimes ignore the best interests of the public in favor of a race for numbers has not been limited to the enforcement program.



In Mid-2006, after nearly nine years of on-again off-again battling with enforcement regarding Stanford, a new Associate Director for Examinations was hired. In short order it became clear that the new Associate Director wanted to create a culture within the examination program that mirrored enforcement’s emphasis on generating numbers. I feared the consequences of shifting from focusing on high risk examinations such as Stanford, to competing with other regional offices for statistical superiority. I expressed my concerns regarding this new approach, but my concerns were dismissed.



In the fall of 2007, the associate director for examinations announced her plan to have us conduct a new type of broker-dealer examination which would consist of interviewing a few senior personnel at brokerage firms over the course of a half day while reviewing limited, if any documentation. I found that plan to be nothing short of a subversion of the core mission of the examination program.



I had always focused Fort Worth’s regional broker-dealer examination program on the primary goal of protecting investors by rooting out fraud and other serious issues. This approach was based on the same tried and true core principles espoused by Director di Florio, recommended by the SEC’s Inspector General in the wake of the Madoff Ponzi scheme, and exemplified by the Fort Worth examination program’s work on Stanford. For example, during my tenure in management in Fort Worth: Examinations were selected based on high risk brokerage practices;



■Examinations were staffed by capable, well-qualified examiners;

■There was meaningful interaction and coordination with the investment advisory examination group;

■There was regular and consistent communication with enforcement staff;

■There was frequent coordination with other regulatory agencies; and

■Examinations were completed in a timely, efficient, and well-documented manner.

These practices quickly identified concerns about Stanford and they were key in developing other significant cases. For example, in 2006, the broker-dealer and investment advisory examination teams along with input from FINRA’s enforcement division devoted significant resources to the review of the sales practices and the investment products being sold to military members. We were successful in helping to bring not only an enforcement action against one of the largest brokerage firms selling to military members, but also our findings were instrumental in Congress’s 2006 decision to enact the Military Personnel Financial Services Protection Act which prohibited future sales of periodic payment plans.



I, and one of the first line supervisors who worked at my direction, Joel Sauer, explained why these mini-examinations would offer no discernable value to the broker-dealer program. We already had extensive information on each firm through past examinations, through quarterly filings, and through the information provided by FINRA which conducted routine examinations on a regular, frequent schedule. Furthermore, such examinations would be at the expense of meaningful program priorities. The Associate Director stated that she wanted a significant increase in numbers and this is how we would do it. The Regional Director concurred with the Associate Director.



Since local management refused to even discuss our concerns, I contacted headquarters, about the Associate Director’s examination proposal. Despite protracted resistance from the Associate Director, OCIE ultimately quashed the mini broker-dealer examinations for some of the same reasons that Mr. Sauer and I had initially expressed.



I paid a heavy price for complaining. First I received a Letter of Reprimand for not being supportive of the Associate Director’s “program initiatives” and for contacting OCIE regarding the Associate Director’s failure to follow OCIE guidelines. Two months later, in June 2008, I was transferred to a new position.



Mr. Sauer complained to the then Chairman, Executive Director and the Director for OCIE for the mistreatment I received. In response he received a Letter of Counseling, daily monitoring, and a Letter of Reprimand for complaining about the Regional Director and the Associate Director. The associate director and regional director made the situation so antagonistic that Mr. Sauer was eventually left the Commission. Only the year before Mr. Sauer had received an award for examination excellence, submitted by these same individuals.



I believe my new position was truly an attempt to drive me out of the Commission. I was assigned to report to the Regional Director (who retired last month) who would at times go weeks or even months intentionally avoiding any contact with me. At times I was not only ignored, but was actively rebuffed in my attempts to perform at a fully functioning level. My responsibilities and duties have generally been undefined and those that have been assigned are generally not commensurate with my pay grade and salary. I have been excluded from training and participation in management meetings or decisions.



Despite these limitations, I have done my best to be productive and effective as well as taking every advantage to learn and grow. I have become more involved in the enforcement investigative process. I have developed relationships with the public affairs office and become more extensively involved in investor education. I have organized training sessions for local staff and other regulators in the region on oil and gas fraud. I took advantage of the opportunity to lead or be involved in four examinations, two of which were with examiners in other regional offices. I’m proud to say that all four resulted in enforcement referrals and the respondents are in the process of settling charges with the Commission or are being actively investigated. There is no doubt in my mind, though, that my situation has diminished my ability to serve the investing public.



The Inspector General released a report in September, 2009 which recommended potential discipline for the associate Director and the regional director (who has since retired), for retaliating against Mr. Sauer and myself. The Commission has failed to discipline any one, at least not visibly, nor has there been any effort made to restore me to a position with similar duties and responsibilities to the one held before.



My situation should not be viewed in isolation. It is part of a cultural problem which continues to impact the Commission’s effectiveness. As Mr. di Florio pointed out in his testimony before the Senate’s Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs in September of 2010, in a self-assessment of OCIE it was concluded there was a need to create an environment for the staff to have open, candid communication and personal accountability for quality. I urge you to seek the trust of the staff by acting on those situations, such as the one in Fort Worth, where management has not fostered the desired environment.



I believe I have been very successful in serving the investing public. I have spearheaded many examinations that resulted in significant findings of fraud and monies recovered for investors. The types of cases I’ve worked on have varied from misconduct on the part of municipal officials, market manipulation, late trading in mutual funds, churning variable annuities, theft, selling inappropriate mutual fund share classes, issuer fraud in private securities, Ponzi schemes and misrepresentations and omissions in the sale of securities to name just a few. I’m proud to say that I have worked on cases where I helped stop fraud against the elderly, military members, municipalities and public institutions, affinity groups and hard-working blue-collar and professional individuals.



Many have asked me why I haven’t left the Commission over the course of the last several years. My answer has always been the same. I believe passionately in the mission of the SEC. I am proud to have devoted most of my professional life to the service of the investing public. I have tried to serve with honor and integrity. I am grateful for the many strong relationships I have developed with managers and staff throughout the Commission, which have kept me going through this difficult period. I am proud of the many accomplishments of the examiners and managers with whom I have worked all of these years. I hope I am fortunate enough to spend the remaining part of my career in the service of the Commission.

Source: Securities And Exchange Commission

2nd US House Panel Presses SEC Over Stanford Fraud

WASHINGTON -(Dow Jones)- A former Securities and Exchange Commission official who was faulted for blocking attempts to investigate jailed money manager R. Allen Stanford may be the target of federal criminal inquiry, SEC officials told lawmakers Friday.
Former Fort Worth Regional Office Enforcement Chief Spencer Barasch, after leaving the SEC, sought three times to represent Stanford as he fought the agency's case, and he briefly represented Stanford in 2006. The SEC made referrals to the Texas state bar and the Washington, D.C., bar as well as to criminal authorities to investigate the matter, SEC Enforcement Chief Robert Khuzami said in testimony before the U.S. House Financial Services Oversight Panel.
SEC Inspector General David Kotz told senators in a hearing last fall that he had spoken with the U.S. Justice Department about opening a probe into Barasch.
During the hearing, Rep. Randy Neugebauer (R., Texas) asked Khuzami if he knew Barasch had represented a client before the commission last Friday. "I was not aware of that," Khuzami said.
Neugebauer said that he doesn't believe the Texas state bar has received a referral regarding Barasch.
Lawmakers at the hearing, many of whom said they represent investors in $7 billion of bogus certificates of deposit issued by Stanford International Bank Ltd., expressed dismay that the SEC hadn't disciplined Barasch and other senior enforcement managers who allegedly stifled attempts to investigate the scheme.
"I don't think the agency is going to change much because I don't see anything where people are being held accountable and responsible," Rep. Steve Pearce (R., N.M.) said.
Khuzami and SEC Examination Chief Carlo di Florio testified the SEC couldn't punish people who have left the agency. Barasch left the SEC in 2005. He now leads the corporate governance and securities enforcement team at Dallas law firm Andrews Kurth LLP.
Khuzami noted that SEC ethics rules bar former employees from ever representing clients before the commission on matters in which they had been heavily involved when they worked there.
SEC spokesman John Nester said the SEC can't move to bar a lawyer from appearing before the commission in the absence of a finding in an SEC administrative hearing that the person acted improperly or unethically or if another court enters into a judgment against the person after being sued by the SEC. Lawyers who have been criminally convicted or disbarred also cannot appear before the commission.
Neugebauer asked whether the ethics rules prohibited former employees from advising clients on SEC matters even if they don't serve as the client's agent before the commission. Khuzami said he believed former employees could advise clients on their dealings with the SEC in some situations.
Neugebauer said the rules should be tightened.
Senior enforcement staff in the SEC's Fort Worth office failed for years to open an investigation into the Stanford bank's certificate of deposits despite numerous red flags, including the conclusions of SEC examiners stretching back to 1997 that they were bogus, the SEC's internal watchdog concluded in a March 2010 report.
Stanford has pleaded not guilty to criminal charges, detailed in a 14-count indictment, that he operated the fraud. He is now awaiting trial, set for September, in a federal medical facility in North Carolina where he is receiving psychiatric treatment.
The SEC will soon determine whether victims of the Ponzi scheme should be covered by federal insurance meant to compensate people missing securities held by brokerages, SEC Deputy Solicitor Michael Conley told lawmakers at the hearing.
The SEC will determine "in the next few weeks" whether the Securities Investor Protection Corp. is wrongly refusing coverage to victims of the fraud, he said. Victims of the fraud have argued for years they deserve compensation from SIPC for the amounts they invested, but SIPC found they aren't covered by federal insurance for failed brokerages because the certificates of deposit were being held at a bank.
Julie Preuitt, an employee of the Fort Worth office who used to manage examination staff, testified as part of a second panel of witnesses that she was still being retaliated against for raising concerns a few years ago about a new "quick-hit" approach to broker-dealer examinations being pushed by her superiors. Preuitt tried to bring the alleged Stanford fraud to the attention of investigators in her office several times, beginning in 1997. Her supervisory duties were removed after she confronted her superiors about the broker examinations.
Preuitt told lawmakers she still has little work and no supervisory duties and that her superiors continue to isolate her.
Di Florio praised Preuitt for doing a "terrific job" attempting to uncover Stanford's fraud. He said, "We are working closely with Ms. Preuitt right now to structure a portfolio of responsibilities that we think demonstrate her talents to the fullest potential," including exams "of national significance."

“The Stanford Ponzi Scheme: Lessons for Protecting Investors from the Next Securities Fraud"

Friday, May 13, 2011 10:00 AM in 2128 Rayburn HOB
Oversight and Investigations


Click here for the Archived Webcast of this hearing.

WITNESS LIST

Panel I

Mr. H. David Kotz, Inspector General, Office of the Inspector General, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Mr. Robert Khuzami, Director, Division of Enforcement, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Mr. Carlo di Florio, Director, Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission

Mr. Richard Ketchum, Chief Executive Officer, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority


Panel II

Ms. Julie Preuitt, Assistant Regional Director, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission Fort Worth Regional Office

Mr. Charles Rawl, former employee Stanford Group Company

Mr. Stanford Kauffman, victim of the Stanford fraud

***********

Submit a Question for YourWitness

UPDATE 1-FBI probing ex-SEC official on Stanford matter

* FBI, U.S. attorney probing ex-SEC official Barasch

* Barasch gave legal advice to Stanford after leaving SEC

* Republicans critical of SEC's failures on Stanford (Rewrites throughout; adds comments from SEC, lawmaker)

Federal criminal authorities are investigating whether a former U.S. securities regulator inappropriately represented alleged fraudster Allen Stanford after he left the agency in 2005.

Spencer Barasch, former head of enforcement for the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission in Fort Worth, Texas, is being probed by the U.S. Attorney's Office and Federal Bureau of Investigation, SEC enforcement director Robert Khuzami and SEC Inspector General David Kotz told lawmakers on Friday.

The criminal probe follows SEC internal findings that Barasch made numerous requests after he left the SEC to represent Stanford and was turned down each time.

Barasch persisted in his requests even though he directly dealt with Stanford matters while at the SEC and was partly responsible for ignoring repeated red flags SEC examiners raised about Stanford as early as 1997, Kotz found in a 2010 report. He later eventually did provide some legal counsel to Stanford in 2006, the report found.

"The rules clearly prohibited [Barasch] from ... in my view, representing Mr. Stanford," Khuzami told a House Financial Services oversight subcommittee on Friday. "We made a referral to criminal authorities."

In addition, Kotz and Khuzami said they had also referred the matter for investigation to the Texas and Washington, D.C. bars.

Republican lawmakers called the hearing to investigate why it took the SEC so long to probe Stanford, a Texas financier, despite repeated attempts by SEC examiners to bring the matter to the enforcement division's attention.

The agency finally filed civil charges against Stanford in February 2009. Stanford was arrested in June 2009 and criminally charged with fraud in connection with a $7 billion scheme linked to certificates of deposit issued by his Antigua-based banking company. Stanford has denied any wrongdoing.

REVOLVING DOOR

After leaving the SEC, Barasch became a partner at law firm Andrews Kurth. In response to an inquiry from Reuters earlier this week, Andrews Kurth Managing Partner Bob Jewell said Barasch had not done anything wrong.

"We disagree with the characterization of Mr. Barasch's involvement put forth by the Inspector General in his report last year," he said. "We believe he acted properly during his contacts with the Stanford Financial Group and the Securities and Exchange Commission. He did not violate conflicts of interest."

The testimony about Barasch came on the same day the Project on Government Oversight, a government watchdog group, issued a report about the "revolving door" at the SEC. It found that 219 former officials at the SEC have left since 2006 to help clients with business before the agency. [ID:nN12129379].

Federal laws place certain restrictions on many SEC and other government employees once they return to the private sector. In addition to a one-year cooling off period, they are generally prohibited from representing a client before a government agency on any matter in which they were personally and substantially involved.

Some lawmakers say stricter policies are needed.

Republican Randy Neugebauer, the chairman of the panel, claimed Barasch represented a client before the SEC in a legal matter as recently as last Friday.

"One of the things that hopefully comes out of this is there are some tighter rules," he said. "It is obviously very alarming." (Reporting by Sarah N. Lynch; editing by Tim Dobbyn and Andre Grenon)

House Republicans to dissect SEC's Stanford failure

SEC to say numerous improvements have been made

* Republicans expected to question SEC competence

* SEC near recommendation on SIPC coverage for victims

U.S. securities regulators will argue they have mended their ways at a congressional hearing Friday into the decade-long failure to investigate Texas financier Allen Stanford's alleged Ponzi scheme.

Republicans are expected to demand answers as to why it took the Securities and Exchange Commission so long to probe Stanford despite repeated attempts by SEC examiners to bring the matter to the enforcement division's attention.

The hearing before the House Financial Services oversight subcommittee could fuel Republican calls to take an ax to the SEC's 2012 budget request.

The SEC says it needs a 16 percent budget increase to boost enforcement efforts and to carry out its new responsibilities under the Dodd-Frank law.

The SEC filed civil charges against Stanford in February 2009. He was then arrested in June 2009 and criminally charged with fraud in connection with a $7 billion scheme linked to certificates of deposit issued by his Antigua-based banking company.

Stanford, who has denied any wrongdoing, is scheduled to go on trial in September.

His arrest came the same month as the sentencing of epic swindler Bernard Madoff, whose Ponzi scheme went undetected for years by the SEC despite tips and the suspicions of some agency staffers.

A Ponzi scheme is one in which money from new investors is used to pay out early investors.

Witnesses at Friday's hearing will include SEC Enforcement Director Robert Khuzami, examinations and inspections director Carlo di Florio, and an SEC employee who repeatedly warned about Stanford and was punished after she complained about watered-down examinations.

Also due to appear is SEC Inspector General David Kotz, who issued a report in 2010 faulting the SEC's enforcement staff for repeatedly failing to investigate Stanford.

He laid out numerous recommendations to improve SEC enforcement and examinations, all of which Kotz will tell lawmakers on Friday "have been implemented and closed to our satisfaction," according to prepared testimony posted on the House panel's website.

Khuzami and di Florio will express deep regret that the SEC failed to act more quickly. "More remains to be done, but...we have made great strides to put in place the people and structures to prevent another occurrence of Stanford-type problems."

Republicans are expected to ask why no one has been disciplined at the SEC over the Stanford matter, and why the victims of the alleged scheme are still fighting to get the Securities Investor Protection Corp to cover their claims.

Khuzami and di Florio's prepared testimony says the SEC is close to finalizing a recommendation to SIPC on whether the victims' claims should be covered.

Fort Worth SEC leader to Resign

Rose Romero, months after a sharp rebuke from the U.S. Senate and a scathing watchdog report, will step down in mid-April as director of the Securities and Exchange Commission's troubled Fort Worth regional office after serving five years, the agency announced Wednesday.

The SEC praised the former Fort Worth police officer and federal prosecutor for leading cases against investment frauds that netted millions in penalties, although in September she was accused of misleading a Senate committee about her office's probe of an alleged Ponzi scheme by Robert Allen Stanford.

"The many successful cases brought by the Fort Worth office are a testament to her commitment and ability," Robert Khuzami, director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement, said in a statement.

Romero did not respond to requests for comment Wednesday.

The SEC quoted her as saying: "I am blessed to have had the opportunity to work with the talented and dedicated professionals in the Fort Worth office. Their commitment to the mission of finding and prosecuting fraud has been remarkable. I will be forever grateful for their dedicated service and their unwavering support."

Although her office handled numerous cases during the past half-decade, her tenure was greatly colored by the Stanford case, which prompted criticism of the SEC for failing to uncover the alleged fraud before and after Romero took over. Sen. David Vitter, R-La., said he obtained confidential e-mails showing that the SEC created a deceptive timeline of the case to make it appear that the agency didn't learn of concerns about Stanford until 2004.

But the agency's inspector general testified that examiners first warned of possible fraud in 1997 and conducted examinations in 1998, 2002 and 2004 -- all before Romero's tenure -- concluding each time that Stanford was likely operating a fraudulent scheme. The report said SEC staff urged the enforcement branch to act but was in effect shut down. The agency moved against Stanford in 2009, three years after Romero took over the regional office, alleging the Eastern Hills High School grad defrauded investors of $8 billion.

Romero repeatedly apologized to the committee but maintained that the agency was aggressively pursing the Stanford operation.

Lawmakers asked Khuzami, who took office two days after the SEC announced the Stanford case, why no one had been fired for not acting against Stanford earlier.

"The process is under way," he said. As for a systemic failure to act, Khuzami said, "We weren't as creative as we should be," adding that operational changes and improved coordination meant that "it wouldn't happen today."

Romero told the Star-Telegram after the hearing that she had not offered her resignation. Wednesday's announcement gave no indication whether she was resigning voluntarily.

The inspector general's investigation into the handling of the Stanford case, issued last March, criticized the office for focusing on "quick hits" to pump up its case numbers instead of pursuing more complex cases that would tie up resources.

It also criticized Romero and one of her lieutenants for taking inappropriate actions toward two staffers who pushed for the Stanford investigation.

Conspicuously absent from the SEC's announcement of the Romero departure was any mention of the Stanford case. Instead, it praised Romero for helping win $137.9 million in penalties from a Swiss firm and multimillion-dollar penalties in other cases. During her tenure, the SEC successfully mounted a case against a former Perot Systems employee who made $8.1 million trading on insider information about Dell's planned takeover of the Dallas firm.

The SEC said Romero plans to practice law in the private sector.

The local office suffered a raft of embarrassing episodes involving career staff members during Romero's time as director, the latest surfacing publicly only this week.

One of her subordinates was among two dozen SEC employees found to have accessed pornography websites while at work, the commission's inspector general disclosed.

SEC monitor: Only "slam-dunk' enforcement cases were encouraged

Inspector general says prosecutions were driven by "stats'

Securities and Exchange Commission officials tried to assure Congress last week that the SEC's examination and enforcement divisions are working together more effectively to catch and prosecute rogue advisers such as Robert Allen Stanford, who allegedly bilked clients out of $8 billion.

In a hearing before the Senate Banking Committee, SEC Inspector General H. David Kotz said that the examination staff in the commission's Fort Worth, Texas, office raised red flags as early as 1997 about certificates of deposit that Mr. Stanford was offering with unusually high interest rates.

But the enforcement staff refused to pursue the matter.

“We found that senior Fort Worth officials perceived that they were being judged on the numbers of cases they brought, so-called stats, and communicated to the enforcement staff that novel or complex cases were disfavored,” Mr. Kotz said. “As a result, cases like Stanford, which were not considered "quick-hit' or "slam-dunk' cases, were not encouraged.”

Mr. Stanford's tangled web of alleged fraud included complex international dimensions, such as the purchase of part of a Caribbean island. The SEC finally filed a case against him in February 2009.

Among Mr. Kotz's recommendations to the SEC: Change the commission's mindset to ensure that potential harm to investors outweighs concerns about litigation risk in pursuing fraud cases and improve coordination between inspection and enforcement.

Robert Khuzami, director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, and Carlo di Florio, director of the Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations, said that they are implementing reforms called for in Mr. Kotz's report.

“I am telling the rank-and-file that quick hits and numbers are not what drive the division,” Mr. Khuzami told lawmakers. “It's not the standard today, I assure you.”

Mr. di Florio and Mr. Khuzami, both of whom assumed their current positions after the Stanford case was filed, said that their divisions are working more closely.

“Both OCIE and enforcement are committed to reforms,” Mr. di Florio said.

In prepared joint testimony, Mr. Khuzami and Mr. di Florio said that they have expanded training programs, streamlined management, “put seasoned investigative attorneys back on the front lines” and improved examiners' risk management techniques.

The Stanford case is making the SEC more willing to take on big, complex cases with uncertain outcomes, according to Robert Mintz, a partner at the law firm McCarter & English.

“It was a major wake-up call to the SEC to act more like prosecutors and less like regulators, and to dig deeper and ask tougher questions as they execute their oversight,” said Mr. Mintz, a former federal prosecutor. “The message from the highest levels of the SEC is filtering down — to increase collaboration and to make sure that information about regulated entities is being shared more effectively.”

Mr. Kotz delivered his report to SEC officials in March. It was released April 16, the same day that the SEC filed a lawsuit against The Goldman Sachs Group Inc. for alleged fraud involving mortgage-backed securities.

The Senate hearing Tuesday gave lawmakers a chance to vent their frustrations with SEC lapses in policing securities markets.

Sen. Richard Shelby, R-Ala., the ranking Republican on the Senate Banking Committee, noted that unlike the $50 billion fraud perpetrated by Bernard Madoff, which caught the SEC unawares, one part of the commission had raised concerns about Mr. Stanford for years.

“I believe this should mark just the beginning of our review of this troublesome episode,” Mr. Shelby said.

“We need to know exactly why evidence of fraud was not more thoroughly pursued,” he said. “This is a colossal failure of the SEC.”

Senators on both sides of the aisle wondered why no one at the SEC had been fired in the wake of the Stanford episode and expressed dismay that the head of the Fort Worth enforcement division later tried to represent Mr. Stanford before the commission.

Sen. Christopher Dodd, D-Conn., chairman of the Senate Banking Committee, was more generous toward the SEC, saying that “there are thousands of people in the SEC who do an incredible job every day.” But he pressed Mr. Kotz on whether the statistics-oriented approach to enforcement is undermining potentially large fraud cases in other SEC regional offices.

“To what extent were examiners frustrated across the country?” Mr. Dodd asked.

Mr. Kotz said that he wasn't aware of specific cases but that the SEC's leadership is trying to move enforcement away from a focus on statistics toward one that emphasizes impact.

“It takes time for a culture to be changed,” he said. “We need to make sure that trickles all the way down the line.”

Senators probe inaction against Stanford

WASHINGTON — Angry senators grilled top officials of the Securities and Exchange Commission on Wednesday, citing the agency's delays in taking action against accused swindler R. Allen Stanford despite repeated red flags about his financial firm's operations.

Lawmakers sharply questioned Rose Romero, the director of the SEC's Fort Worth regional office, and Robert Khuzami, the agency's national enforcement director, about a report from the agency's independent inspector general.

It found that the Fort Worth compliance office decided at least four times not to act on findings by SEC staffers that Stanford appeared to be operating a Ponzi scheme.

Committee chairman Chris Dodd, D-Conn., described the situation as one in which "you had an examination office yelling 'fire, fire, fire' and an enforcement branch yelling 'no fire.'"

Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison, R-Texas, called the revelations "stunning" and said that she hoped something is being done to make sure such a lapse doesn't happen again.

Stanford, 60, and three other executives of Houston-based Stanford Financial Group are accused in federal indictments of running a $7 billion investment fraud scheme using certificates of deposit issued by a Stanford bank on the Caribbean island of Antigua.

Stanford is being held without bail in Houston as a flight risk. He has denied wrongdoing and is scheduled for trial in January. The others will be tried separately and are free on bail.

The inspector general's report concluded that Fort Worth SEC officials harbored suspicions that Stanford was acting illegally as early as 1997, two years after his company's broker-dealer arm, Stanford Group Co., registered with the SEC.

Over the next eight years, the compliance branch of the Fort Worth office conducted four separate examinations of Stanford's investments and reported each time that the high returns and low volatility were "highly unlikely" and inconsistent with a "legitimate" fund.

All four times, Fort Worth's enforcement team chose not to act on the findings. The enforcement team first opened a formal investigation into Stanford's company in 2005.

The SEC filed a civil fraud suit in February 2009 against Stanford and his companies, which were placed in receivership. A federal grand jury handed down the criminal indictments four months later.

In testimony Wednesday, SEC Inspector General H. David Kotz blamed the agency's culture, saying senior SEC officials thought they were being judged by the number of cases they processed, not on the number of investors affected or the size of the fraud.

As a result, Kotz said, the Fort Worth office focused on cases considered "quick hits" or "slam dunks." Complicated cases such as Stanford's were put off or handed to state securities boards.

Romero, who joined the Fort Worth office in 2006, expressed regret that the SEC had not acted more quickly to limit investor losses.

Khuzami, the top SEC enforcement official in Washington, said the SEC believed that it had not gathered enough evidence at the time of the earlier warnings. He said losing in court would have given Stanford "a Good Housekeeping seal of approval" to call his investments safe because a judge had rejected the SEC's claim. But Khuzami conceded, "We did not pursue the evidence as hard as we should have."

Cassie Wilkinson, a Houston resident who lost her savings when Stanford's companies were placed into receivership, attended the hearing with other Stanford investors. She called the SEC's testimony an effort to "cover their backsides" and said it needs a "housecleaning."

"There were obviously people who did not do their jobs, and no one has been fired. Investors have lost $7 billion. That seems wrong," she said.