Monday 23 June 2014

‘They’re fighting over our money’


Those searching for Stanford dollars get twice as much as victims 

BY BILL LODGE
blodge@theadvocate.com 
June 23, 2014 

Court-authorized professionals cleaning up the debris of one of the largest Ponzi schemes in U.S. history have been paid $64.2 million — more than twice the amount returned so far to victims — and are seeking more compensation.

 Those professionals have recovered less than $300 million of the estimated $5.5 billion to $7 billion stolen from thousands of victims in Louisiana and in places as distant as Venezuela by convicted Houston swindler Robert Allen Stanford, whose company operated an office in Baton Rouge.

 Attorneys, accountants and investigators searching since February 2009 for the mountains of money had been paid $64.2 million of the victims’ money recovered by the end of 2013.

 Expenses incurred in the search by the court receivership team cost another $54.7 million, federal court records show.

 That’s $118.9 million of victims’ money spent on the search for Stanford’s swindled dollars out of a total of $240.9 million recovered by Dec. 31 in the five-year effort.

 Victims have received a combined $30 million — paid last year as a first distribution to some of the thousands of Stanford’s victims in Louisiana and other states. Another $25 million authorized by a judge for payment to victims has yet to be distributed.

 Now, Dallas attorney Ralph S. Janvey, the court-appointed receiver in charge of the search, is asking U.S. District Judge David C. Godbey for permission to withdraw $5.8 million from a disputed pot of $17.3 million in fees for payment to members of his search team.

 Don’t do it, a court-appointed examiner and the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission have implored Godbey.

 In Louisiana, some of Stanford’s victims have the same response.

 Kathy and Louis Mier, of Zachary, were defrauded of $240,000 they invested with Stanford.

 “Janvey, from day one, was trying to make money off us,” Kathy Mier, a 66-year-old retired schoolteacher, said. “We resent the fact that those lawyers take advantage of us. They’re fighting over our money."

 Richard Cochran, 82, of Baton Rouge, who declined to specify his total loss, noted that he received 21.7 percent of his investment in the form of interest payments before the SEC shut down Stanford’s operations in February 2009.

 Now, the Korean War veteran said, Janvey’s team has demanded that he make payments into the Stanford receivership equal to that 21.7 percent.

 Cochran said he refused, noting that compliance would increase his Stanford loss to 100 percent.

 “Janvey said in the beginning all we’re going to get is pennies on the dollar,” Cochran recalled. “He’s making that come true.”

 Added Cochran: “He (Janvey) probably ought to get what we get on our claims — 1 percent.”

 In his filings in Dallas, Janvey has told the judge his team should receive $5.8 million of the disputed $17.3 million that Janvey contends has already been earned.

 By the middle of March, Janvey reported to Godbey, the receivership had recovered another $23 million in stolen investor funds.

 John J. Little, a Dallas attorney who has served as court-appointed examiner of the Stanford receivership for the past five years, argued June 9 that the judge should not release any portion of the $17.3 million to Janvey’s team.

 “What we know at present is that the receiver and his professionals have not identified any significant Stanford assets or accounts that were not identified in the earliest days of the receivership,” Little said.

 In addition, Little told Godbey, Janvey has not distributed $25 million of $55 million the judge authorized for pro rata payment last year to Stanford victims.

 Janvey’s 2009 demand was opposed by both the SEC and the investors lucky enough not to have lost all their money.

 The receiver’s motion for seizure of their remaining money also was denied by Godbey after SEC officials said commission policy is not to recover money from innocent fraud victims who lost more money than they received from a bogus investment operation.

 But Janvey, spending recovered Stanford funds, appealed the decision to the 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in New Orleans, where he lost.

 Both Little and the SEC now argue that the receivership’s record should be much closer to completion before the judge considers release of any of the $17.3 million withheld from Janvey’s team over the past five years.

 “What has actually been distributed to Stanford’s investors — approximately $30 million — is less than half what has already been paid to the receiver’s professionals,” Little added.

 Little said no more investor money should be paid to Janvey’s team until the total paid to the victims “significantly exceeds the amounts paid to the receiver and his professionals.”

 Said SEC attorney David B. Reece: “The question is not whether the receiver and supporting professionals should receive compensation. The receiver’s team has been paid.”

 Reece noted Janvey’s team has been paid $34 million more than Stanford’s victims.

 “There is no reason to release further funds,” Reece told the judge.

 Meanwhile, Stanford, 64, continues to maintain he is innocent of all charges for which he is serving a prison sentence of 110 years. He has filed an appeal in an effort to reverse his conviction.

 The SEC and Godbey have concluded that Stanford and his companies operated a giant Ponzi scheme from the beginning of their operations.

 Few, if any, investments are actually made in a Ponzi scheme. Instead, operators of the scheme skim most of the money that is put in by victims on the basis of false information provided by the criminals.

 Some of the early investors receive small portions of their own money and that of later investors. While those investors believe the money is profit from actual operations, it is simply seed money designed to attract additional cash from people hearing of the program’s reputed success.

 Stanford Group Co., insured by the federally chartered and industry-funded Securities Investor Protection Corp., received billions of dollars that victims were told would be secure at Stanford International Bank in the Caribbean nation of Antigua.

 Instead, a Houston jury concluded, the majority of the money went to Stanford and several of his associates. 

The SEC, in effect, directed SIPC to cover individual Stanford investor losses up to $500,000.

 SIPC officials refused and won a judgment from a federal district judge in Washington, D.C. The SEC is appealing that decision.

To join the debate click here.

For a full and open debate on the Stanford receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official Forum http://sivg.org.ag/


Sunday 15 June 2014

Antigua's New PM signs MOA for EC $2 billion project

This is good news. Antigua recently held elections and a new PM was elected the Honourable Gaston Brown. Mr Brown has signed the Memorandum of Agreement for the development of Guiana Island to Yida. The agreement by the Antigua government to allow the construction of a five five-star hotel will enable Grant Thornton to proceed with the sale to Guiana Island to Yida who will be keen to develop the island.....And in turn provide more money to be returned to victims from the sale. 

ST JOHN’S, Antigua – One day after taking up the position of Prime Minister, Gaston Browne has signed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with Yida International Investment Antigua Ltd to pave the way for a two-billion dollar investment project in this twin-island-state.

According to a government press statement, the MOA emerged after an eight-hour session of negotiations on Saturday, June 14.

Yida International is expected to invest over 200 million dollars annually in the economy over the next 10 years, as well as provide an Antigua & Barbuda presence in the People’s Republic of China to attract additional economically viable investments.

PM Browne stated, “I promised the people that my administration would bring the type of investments to the country that will transform Antigua & Barbuda into an economic powerhouse and I am serious about that promise. “This Memorandum of Agreement is the result of our determination to work in the interest of the people of the country,” he added.

Yida investors say the initiative will see the transformation of Guiana Island and surrounding lands via the construction of five five-star hotels. 

Thirteen hundred (1,300) residential units, a casino, conference centre, 27-hole golf course, marina and landing facilities, as well as a commercial, retail and sports facility will also be built.

Attorney General and Minister of Justice and Legal Affairs, Immigration and Labour, Steadroy Benjamin, who witnessed the MOA, said the new Antigua & Barbuda Labour Party (ABLP) is about delivering for the people of Antigua & Barbuda.

Benjamin pointed out, “We were elected convincingly by the majority of the people of the country and we are committed to live up to our promises. One major promise is to provide jobs. This project will ensure that we move people from unemployed to being employed.”

During the lead up to the 2014 election, Prime Minister Browne vowed that his administration, when elected, would bring tangible investments that will generate much needed economic growth for the country.

To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group - SIVG official Forum http://sivg.org.ag/ 


Tuesday 29 April 2014

HOW A FORMER SENIOR SEC OFFICIAL MANIPULATED THE SYSTEM FOR HIS CLIENTS' AND HIS OWN BENEFIT


Two years ago, Spencer C. Barasch, a former high-ranking Securities and Exchange Commission official based in Fort Worth, Texas, paid a $50,000 fine to settle civil charges brought against him by the United States Department of Justice for allegedly violating federal conflict-of-interest laws. The Department of Justice had alleged that Barasch, as a private attorney, had represented R. Allen Stanford, a Houston-based financier who was later found to have masterminded a $7 billion Ponzi scheme. Barasch had done so even though he'd played a central role at the SEC for years in overruling colleagues who wanted to investigate Stanford’s massive fraud. Federal law prohibits former SEC officials from representing anyone as a private attorney if they played a substantial or material role in overseeing the individual's actions while in government.

In part because of that episode, Barasch, rightfully or wrongfully, has served as an example for critics of the SEC who say that it—and the US government as a whole—has done too little to hold accountable those financial institutions responsible for the 2008 financial crisis and other corporate wrongdoers. James Kidney, a respected trial attorney for the SEC, recently drew attention when he asserted in his retirement speech that the agency’s pervasive “revolving door” has led to a paucity of enforcement actions against seemingly untouchable Wall Street executives. More than two dozen current and former SEC officials that I have interviewed about these matters largely agree with Kidney on the takeaway: Quite simply, American investors can no longer expect the protection they once did, and powerful Wall Street executives who have violated the law will continue to go unchecked.

 A three-month investigation by VICE has uncovered evidence of numerous similar instances of misconduct and potential violations of federal conflict-of-interest regulations and law by Barasch since he left the SEC. And while Barasch’s legal representation of Stanford might have been the single most consequential and egregious example of such misconduct, the new information shows that Barasch’s actions in representing Stanford were hardly an anomaly. The new disclosures serve as further ammunition for those who argue that the SEC has been tepid in its enforcement of such regulations and its punishment of those who would violate them.

 David Kotz, who served as the SEC’s inspector general from 2007 to 2012, investigated the agency's regulatory failure in pursuing Stanford’s Ponzi scheme and wrote a scathing report criticizing the actions of Barasch and other officials. Information that Kotz uncovered during that investigation led to the Justice Department’s charges that Barasch violated federal conflict-of-interest laws by representing Stanford.

 After examining the new information and previously undisclosed documents uncovered for this story, Kotz said: “Based upon the documents and information you provided me, and given the record of Barasch’s previous actions, I would say that there are questions about several matters in which Barasch had conversations about while he was at the SEC—during the same time that he was engaged in discussions for prospective employment—that should be scrutinized further to determine whether there were violations of conflict-of-interest statutes and regulations.”

 Barasch, through his lawyer, Paul Coggins, a former United States attorney for the Dallas-Fort Worth area, declined to comment for this story. “Neither Spencer nor I will be commenting for the story,” Coggins said in an email.

 The broad findings of my investigation are as follows:


  •  Inspector General Kotz concluded in 2010 that Barasch may have violated federal conflict-of-interest rules through his legal representation of a Plano, Texas–based electronics company, Microtune. Barasch represented Microtune as a private attorney even though he had earlier investigated the company while working as a SEC enforcement official. According to previously confidential SEC records, Barasch escaped any punishment as a sole result of the SEC’s then general counsel setting aside Kotz’s recommendation that evidence about the alleged wrongdoing be referred to two state bar associations for further investigation. 

  • During his final days at the SEC, Barasch was being courted by Houston law firm Andrews Kurth, where he is now currently employed as a partner who leads the firm’s corporate-governance and securities-enforcement team. According to confidential internal emails from Andrews Kurth, the firm apparently considered using Barasch to learn inside information about a potential civil fraud lawsuit that, at the time, the SEC was considering filing against the law firm. The potential lawsuit concerned legal work Andrews Kurth did for Enron, the Houston-based energy and commodities company, before it went bankrupt in December 2001 and following the discovery that the company’s leadership had engaged in one of the largest accounting frauds in US history. Confidential Andrews Kurth emails suggest that the firm's partners were eager to learn what action if any the SEC might take against them, and hoped Barasch, still with the SEC, could find out. Any discussion by Barasch with anyone at the SEC regarding Andrews Kurth’s representation of Enron would constitute a violation of federal conflict-of-interest laws, SEC officials and outside experts told me in numerous interviews. 

  •  Less than three months before Barasch and the principals of Andrews Kurth began discussing the possibility of bringing him on as a partner, Barasch settled a foreign bribery case with an oil-and-gas services-and-equipment company, BJ Services, which was being represented in the matter by Andrews Kurth. Barasch supervised the SEC’s investigation of BJ Services, negotiated directly with Andrews Kurth partners to settle the case, and settled on terms favorable to the company, according to confidential records. “I like him and as I mentioned had some really good dealings with him in connection with resolving BJ Services FCPA [Foreign Corrupt Practices Act] problems,” one Andrews Kurth partner emailed another, as the firm was trying to recruit Barasch in December 2004. While by themselves Barasch’s talks with Andrews Kurth about taking on a job after his employment at the SEC might have been technically within the confines of the law, former colleagues he worked with at the SEC say they believe Barasch should not have discussed employment with a law firm with which he had only recently been negotiating to settle a case: “It is not just optics. What he did creates an appearance of impropriety,” a former SEC official who had worked with Barasch said.


This story is based on more than 1,000 pages of confidential records from inside Andrews Kurth—hundreds of emails, personal notes of partners of the firm, and billing records. Hundreds of pages of previously confidential SEC files, as well as public court records and public SEC records, were also reviewed. And more than two dozen former SEC officials and private attorneys who have worked with Barasch or Andrews Kurth spoke with me.


From 1998 to 2005, during his tenure as the chief enforcement officer of the SEC’s Dallas–Fort Worth regional branch, Barasch overruled examiners in his own office who wanted to investigate Stanford. Year after year, and with increasing urgency, they warned Barasch that Stanford was likely running a “massive Ponzi scheme” and also engaged in international money laundering. But each time the examiners sought to open a file, Barasch quashed any potential investigation.

 The SEC examiners weren’t able to persuade their superiors to investigate Stanford until 2005—exactly one day after Barasch left the agency to become a partner at Andrews Kurth. By then, investors in the US and overseas had lost additional billions of dollars. When Stanford was eventually arrested and charged, in March 2009, he had stolen more than $7 billion—the second largest Ponzi scheme in American history. Only Bernard Madoff stole more.

 To date, no concrete evidence has surfaced that Barasch’s suppression of the various potential probes of Stanford was anything more nefarious than bad judgment. Stanford ran his Ponzi scheme from his offshore bank, the Stanford International Bank, on the Caribbean island of Antigua. Barasch and others at the SEC said they did not believe that the SEC had proper jurisdiction to investigate, and that it would be difficult to obtain the necessary records from overseas. The SEC’s bungling the investigation of the Stanford Ponzi scheme is considered by many to be one of the worst—and most costly—regulatory failures in the history of the US government.

 But more so than quashing the potential Stanford probes, it was what Barasch did almost immediately after leaving the SEC that deeply angered many of his former SEC colleagues: He briefly represented Stanford as a partner with his new law firm, Andrews Kurth. Barasch appeared to be cashing in on his own missteps as a government official.

 Moreover, federal law explicitly prohibited Barasch from representing Stanford: Former SEC officials are barred from representing as private attorneys individuals or corporations about whom they have made substantial or material decisions while in the government. This resulted in the Justice Department bringing civil charges against Barasch. On January 13, 2012, Barasch agreed to a $50,000 settlement. The Justice Department alleged that Barasch’s “supervisory position at the SEC,” during which he engaged in the “oversight of the investigation of Stanford Financial Group… restricted him from future private representation of Stanford Financial Group before the SEC." Barasch had chosen to defy the lifetime restriction on representing Stanford.

 Besides the $50,000 fine, Barasch also agreed to a one-year ban on practicing before the agency as punishment for his representation of Stanford. In agreeing to settle matters with the Justice Department and SEC, Barasch was not required to admit to any wrongdoing.

 Asked by then SEC inspector general Kotz why he was so determined to represent Stanford, Barasch candidly responded: “Every lawyer in Texas and beyond is going to get rich over this case. OK? And I hated being on the sidelines.”

 A former Andrews Kurth employee told me that Barasch informed his law partners that the firm stood to earn $2 million or more from representing Stanford: “There is lot pressure for a new partner just walking in the door to prove themselves. And the way to do that here was to bring in a new client who could pay high fees. It’s not surprising that some corners were cut.”

 Barasch’s behavior in attempting to get Stanford’s business for Andrews Kurth is strikingly similar, my investigation found, to his involvement with another client he helped bring to the firm: Microtune, the Texas electronics firm that specialized in manufacturing semiconductors.

 At the SEC, Barasch had overseen a 2005 securities-fraud investigation of Microtune. At Andrews Kurth, Barasch represented Microtune when it came under a second investigation for an entirely new and separate matter, during which time Barasch met with former colleagues at the SEC without conferring with the SEC’s ethics counsel. The role that Barasch played in representing Microtune is detailed in hundreds of pages of internal Andrews Kurth records.

 Former SEC inspector general Kotz concluded in a 2010 memo that Barasch potentially violated federal conflict-of-interest rules by meeting with former colleagues without prior ruling from the SEC’s ethics counsel that it would be legal or ethical to do so.

 The inspector general recommended that his findings be forwarded to the state bar associations of Texas and the District of Columbia, where Barasch was licensed to practice law. Previously confidential SEC records indicate that no action was taken because the SEC’s general counsel at the time, David Becker, did not believe that Barasch’s alleged wrongdoing was strong enough to warrant such action.

 Two sources—one of whom is a former Andrews Kurth employee—say that Andrews Kurth earned $1.5 million from the firm’s representation of Microtune. One of these people explained to me: “Why would you put your reputation or livelihood at risk? Why would you put your law firm at risk? Because there is so much money to do so, and unfortunately little down side if you are caught.”

 Barasch and Andrews Kurth jumped at the chance to represent Microtune. In 2005, Microtune settled a civil case brought by the SEC alleging accounting fraud. Barasch supervised that investigation of Microtune, according to government records and interviews.

 In 2007, the SEC opened a new inquiry as to whether Microtune had engaged in securities fraud by misstating to its stockholders the backdating of stock options to some of its top executives. Microtune wanted to get out in front of the investigation and tasked Andrews Kurth with conducting its own internal investigation of the allegations Microtune was facing. (Increasingly, corporations conduct internal investigations of their own conduct to gain leniency from the government by disclosing their own wrongdoing and, critics say, to sometimes deflect attention and protect senior corporate executives by laying blame on subordinates.)

 Because Barasch had overseen the earlier investigation of Microtune, he was required by federal regulation to seek permission from the SEC’s ethics counsel as to whether he could represent the company in private practice. Because he did not do so, the SEC inspector general concluded that he had violated federal law by meeting with former colleagues at the SEC about the matter without obtaining such approval.

 Retaining Barasch and Andrews Kurth to advocate their case paid off for Microtune. On June 30, 2008, the SEC filed a civil lawsuit alleging that Mictrotune and two of its highest executives “perpetrated a fraudulent and deceptive stock option backdating scheme” in which they “awarded themselves” and their colleagues millions of dollars in compensation not properly reported to stockholders. On the very same day the SEC’s charges were filed, Microtune settled the case on highly favorable terms. In settling the SEC’s lawsuit, Mictrotune was not required to admit any wrongdoing or even pay a fine.

 Two former executives of Microtune, however, did not fare so well. The firm’s former chairman and CEO, Douglas Bartek, and its chief financial officer and general counsel, Nancy Richardson, fought the charges. Both of them were cleared after a federal appeals court ruled in August 2012 that the SEC had not filed the charges against the two executives until the statute of limitations had expired.

 Unsurprisingly, this raised some eyebrows among Barasch’s former colleagues at the SEC, as the internal investigation he participated in had largely exonerated Microtune and laid blame squarely on Bartek and Richardson who had both been made wholly expendable by leaving the company.

 And some of Barasch’s former colleagues I interviewed thought he held a personal vendetta against Bartek. During the initial SEC investigation of Microtune, which Barasch had supervised, he originally sought to bring charges against Bartek, but other enforcement officials at the SEC counseled that they did not believe they had a viable case against him. And as the then CEO of his own company, Bartek had the financial resources to fight any possible charges. According to one of Barasch’s former colleagues at the SEC, Barasch was told by Bartek's legal team, “If [the SEC] bring this case we are going to fight tooth-and-nail.” Barasch begrudgingly backed down.

 Another former SEC colleague of Barasch’s told me, “Spencer believed that Bartek unjustly escaped the noose the first time… He was still smarting from [not being able to charge] the first time. Now he had a second bite at the apple.” 

Even though Kotz concluded that Barasch likely violated federal conflict-of-interest laws, the SEC did absolutely nothing. It did not refer Kotz’s findings to the bar associations, as per his recommendation. Nor did it take any disciplinary action against Barasch. This was because the SEC’s then general counsel David Becker overruled Kotz. As Becker saw it, even though Barasch had overseen the earlier investigation of Microtune while at the SEC, the new options-backdating case was different enough to conclude that Barasch had not violated conflict-of-interest regulations, according to previously confidential SEC files. Because, in Becker’s view, there was no conflict of interest, Barasch did not deserve to be punished for having circumvented the SEC’s ethics counsel. Another former senior SEC official told me, “What harm could have come from someone simply examining the evidence? Becker’s decision foreclosed even that possibility.”

 Six former SEC officials told me in interviews that it was suspicious that Barasch had never sought the advice of the SEC ethics counsel. “It is the first call that I make—that any of us make—when we are considering a representation,” one official put it succinctly. “It takes a few minutes to make the call, and you are in the clear if you get approval. It’s necessary to do if you want to cover yourself. There is just too much downside to your reputation, your career, and, most of all, your firm.”

 Another former SEC attorney, who worked with Barasch, told me, “The only reason that you would not check is because you thought the answer might be no and you wouldn’t be able to do the representation. The only reason you would not check with the ethics office first is if you were trying to get around the system… Barasch agreed to represent Microtune without talking to the [SEC] ethics office. He represented Microtune without asking the ethics office. He didn’t in the first case because he knew the answer would be no. He didn’t in the second case because he knew there was a chance he would be told no.”

 Barasch’s actions in regard to his representation of Microtune were strikingly similar to his alleged illegal representation of Stanford. In the case of Microtune, Barasch never contacted the SEC ethics counsel at all. In the case of Stanford, shortly after leaving the SEC in 2005, Barasch had sought to represent Stanford and sought out guidance from the SEC ethics counsel about whether he would be allowed to do so—only to be told by the counsel that he could not represent Stanford. Barasch complied.

 In 2006, the SEC would intensify its investigation of Stanford, and in turn Stanford sought out Barasch to represent him. This time, however, Barasch simply began representing Stanford without seeking consent from the SEC’s ethics counsel. Barasch’s representation only ended when he called a former colleague to discuss the case, causing an uproar among several of Barasch’s former colleagues in the SEC’s Dallas–Fort Worth office. Barasch ended his representation of Stanford only when the ethics counsel told him that to continue to do so would be flat-out illegal.

 But Barasch’s alleged ethical lapses were potentially profitable (in the case of Stanford) and actually profitable (in the case of Microtune, Andrew Kurth earned $1.5 million). Barasch told his law partners that he stood to make as much as $2 million or more if Andrews Kurth defended Stanford before the SEC, according to a former firm employee.

 “People ask why corporations are given a slap on the wrist,” a former SEC litigation attorney told me in an interview. “Well, look at the regulators—and how they are regulators. If the SEC gives a slap on the wrist to someone powerful on Wall Street, look at the slap on the wrist for the regulators. Spencer Barasch and Andrews Kurth stood to earn millions if they represented Stanford. Barasch’s punishment: a $50,000 fine. You tell me they made $1.5 million from Microtune. Nobody even got in trouble for that one.”

 Many enforcement attorneys who still work for the SEC, or have since left, feel similarly. But those who continue to work there are not allowed to voice their criticisms publicly. And many of those who have left the SEC are loath to publicly make such comments, because once in private practice they have to represent clients before the Commission.

 Thus, it was left to one of the SEC’s most respected trial counselors, James Kidney, to say what his colleagues could not and cannot. Kidney worked as a lawyer for the SEC but never went through the revolving door, making him one of the rare enforcement officials who is able to speak freely. After a long and distinguished career, Kidney gave a poignant speech at his retirement party on March 27 of this year, in which he inexorably tied the SEC’s tepid response to bringing cases against the powerful to its conflict-of-interest revolving door. Kidney told his former colleagues:

 The revolving door is a very serious problem. I have had bosses, and bosses of my bosses, whose names we all know, who made little secret that they were here to punch their ticket. They mouthed serious regard for the mission of the Commission, but their actions were tentative and fearful in many instances… Don’t take risks where risk would count. That is not the intended message from the ticket punchers, of course, but it is the one I got on the occasions when I was involved in a high-profile case or two. The revolving door doesn’t push the agency’s enforcement envelope very often or very far.

 The attitude trickles down the ranks… It is no surprise that we lose our best and brightest, as they see no place to go in the agency and eventually decide they are just going to get their own ticket to a law firm or a corporate job punched. They see an agency that polices the broken windows on the street level and rarely goes to the penthouse floors. On the rare occasions when enforcement does go to the penthouse, good manners are paramount. Tough enforcement—risky enforcement—is subject to extensive negotiation and weakening.


Just as Barasch was preparing to leave the SEC, Andrews Kurth was facing legal problems of its own. The firm was under investigation by the SEC for legal advice it had given to the failed energy giant Enron. The firm’s partners were anxious for any word as to whether the SEC might bring charges.

 Barasch told his soon-to-be law partners that before he could formally accept their offer, he wanted to go to Washington, DC, to visit with his superiors and see whether they were fine with his leaving. According to confidential emails, Barasch worried that some at the agency might think he was simply too valuable to leave. If told so in DC, Barasch informed his suitors at Andrews Kurth, he might just have to stay.

 Several of Barasch’s former SEC colleagues told me that this was a bit of puffery at the expense of truth: “There is nobody at the SEC who doesn’t leave whenever they want. There is no such thing as anyone, even the chairwoman, who is not free to leave.” Another said, “Nobody was going to tell Spencer Barasch that he was too important to leave. That's just not even close to reality.”

 According to the same batch of confidential emails, Barasch then informed his soon-to-be colleagues at Andrews Kurth that one of the persons he was seeing in DC—to ask permission to leave the agency—was Linda Thomsen, the then deputy enforcement chief, who also happened to be the head of the SEC’s Enron task force. In other words, she was the single person who not only knew but would make the final decision as to whether the SEC would sue Andrews Kurth for its Enron work.

 Just as Barasch was about to leave for the capital, Jerry Beane, a senior partner at Andrews Kurth, who had been working to lure Barasch from the SEC, sent Barasch an email detailing various litigations against the firm under the heading “Update Concerning Enron Litigation—ATTORNEY CLIENT PRIVILEGE.” Beane wrote in the email: “As we have previously reported to you, the Firm is a defendant in two Enron-related lawsuits pending in federal district court in Houston…” At one point in the email, Beane bleakly reported that Enron stockholders were alleging that Andrews Kurth assisted Enron in transactions that allegedly allowed Enron to distort its financial condition.

Beane wrote: “Although we hope otherwise and firmly believe that the shareholders have not plead a cause of action under federal securities laws, it may well be that [the federal judge hearing the case] rules… that the pleadings in the… case sufficiently allege a course of action against us.”

 The following day, Andrews Kurth managing partner Harold Ayers—who had been copied on Beane's email to Barasch—sent a two-word email to both of them, simply asking, “Any word?”

 Ayers’s question suggests that he and others at Andrews Kurth might have been asking about whether their law firm was going to be sued for their Enron work. Or it could be interpreted as asking whether Barasch had been given the go-ahead by the SEC to leave and join the firm.

 A subsequent email suggests that Ayers believed that Barasch might learn something about the SEC’s plans as to whether or not to sue Andrews Kurth over its Enron work.

 On February 27, Ayers emailed several of his law partners, writing: I talked to Spence this evening. All systems are go for him leaving the SEC and joining AK. He will be in DC on Wednesday thru Friday of this coming week. He will be telling the SEC folks that he is leaving to go to AK. One of the people he will be talking to is the head of the Enron task force. Spence had some questions about the upcoming meeting between AK and the SEC. I told him that Ross [another Andrews Kurth partner] was the best person to provide the details. There is no problem with Spence. He just wants to respond if there is any question of comment. Ross, can you call Spence at his office on Monday or Tuesday to discuss?

 Ultimately, the SEC did not sue Andrews Kurth for its Enron work.

 But in January 2007, Andrews Kurth agreed to pay Enron’s bankruptcy estate $18.5 million for alleged malpractice committed by the firm. Earlier, Neil Baston, a court-appointed examiner responsible for distributing money to Enron’s creditors and defrauded investors, stated in a report to the court that an examiner he retained “concluded that there is sufficient evidence from which a fact-finder could determine that Andrews Kurth committed malpractice” and violated Texas bar-association rules while representing Enron.

 Under terms of the agreement to settle the civil Enron litigation, Andrews Kurth did not admit any wrongdoing. At the time, Harold Ayers was quoted as saying, “We have continuously denied wrongdoing and culpability with respect to our work for Enron… We felt, though, after the passage of five years, that it was expedient to enter into the settlement to put this matter behind us.”

To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/

Monday 7 April 2014

ITALBANK Questions and Answers

I have today spoken to one of the directors of ITALBANK. I am asking all victims that have any questions or problems with the system that the bank have set up for payment to please post your queries on this forum.

I will then get an answer directly from ITALBANK and you will be able to share their answer with all of the other victims via this forum and the blog. Please let other victims know that this forum will be helping you to get the answers you are looking for and we will also get you any help you may need in completing the necessary forms for a payment.

Please keep this posting strictly for questions and answers concerning registration or payments with ITALBANK.

To post your questions click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/

Sunday 30 March 2014

It's a Scandal that Fraudsters Bernie Madoff and Robert Allen Stanford Were Not Shut Down by the SEC

Believe it or not Bernie Madoff’s phony monthly trading reports listed trades on days the market was closed, or at prices that were far off the market or in volumes that simply never existed. Yet, Madoff’s scam continued for 36 years, from 1972 until 2008, as the SEC was incapable of discovering the truth, and Madoff’s clients never read their phoney monthly statements, since through bull and bear markets Madoff always turned in profits that were not real. And shocking as it may seem, the SEC knew that Stanford was a fraud early on in 1998, but chose not to prosecute as the securities he sold were short term notes of a foreign bank supposedly yielding 12% and were not shares of stock. Imagine the stupidity of that pusillanimous decision. What a bunch of wimps!

 Such were the most shocking revelations at a Boston College Conference on the Madoff and Stanford Cases ” The Legacy of Mr. Ponzi,” that the American College of Bankruptcy organized last Friday, at which I was a speaker on the Madoff crimes. I emphasized the lackadaisical performance by the Securities and Exchange Commission as the key absurdity of allowing these crimes to damage so many naive investors who wanted to believe against all past investment history that Madoff’s year-in,year-out returns of 9%-10% and Stanford’s offer of a 12% coupon on his bank’s notes could somehow be a rational expectation by small investors entrusting these two con men with most of their valuable savings. By comparison, Mr. Ponzi was put out of business in a very short time long before there was even an SEC existing. So much for the securities regulatory process where scams are concerned. It is a travesty of justice.

 Clearly, the SEC should have had the smarts and the will to put Madoff and Stanford out of business before they were able to do so much harm. The fact that the SEC was inadequate to the challenge should give legislators the motivation to order a review of the agency’s leadership, manpower, and its statutory powers. It appears that the political connections of Madoff and the political contributions by Stanford may well have dulled or dented the investigations into their chicanery and kept the cops off the beat. Especially, as in the case of Madoff, the recent conviction of 5 employees together with the conviction of Madoff’s brother and other high-level employees reveals clearly the conspiracy pretty well included between 15 and 20 people. Stanford’s behavior involved an offshore bank in the Caribbean and so must not have been seen as so crucial to the SEC. It’s ability to make securities criminal cases is far overshadowed by the Justice Department.

 After 6 years of progress, Irving H. Picard, the Trustee for the Liquidation of Bernard L. Madoff Investments Securities, has been able to pay the innocent Madoff investors back 56% of the money they lost. With any luck in another 155 claims for $6 billion more payments, Picard is hopeful of returning 100% to those legitimate Madoff losers. “ My goal is 100%”, he said before a crowd of over 100 students and bankruptcy experts at Boston College Law School in Newton, Mass. on Friday. He has spent $980 million in legal and administrative fees to collect $9.8 billion so far. By comparison the Stanford fundraising is only about $240 million, while the costs have been $120 million or 50% of receipts. Picard revealed for the first time that fabricated backdated trades for Madoff’s sons(one committed suicide) in Apple common shares that threw off paper profits of $6.5 million suggests that they “should have known” the enterprise was a scam.

To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/


Saturday 29 March 2014

Senator Vitter's Letter to Sharon Bowen

 
To join the debate click here

 For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/


U.S. Senator sets hurdle for CFTC hopeful Bowen

(Reuters) - A U.S. senator questioned a candidate for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission over a decision that left victims of the Allen Stanford fraud out of pocket, raising a hurdle she must jump to get the job.

 In a letter on Friday, Louisiana Republican David Vitter asked Sharon Bowen - who has been nominated by President Barack Obama to join the derivatives regulator - a series of 10 questions about her role in the decision.

 Bowen is the acting head of the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC), the body that seeks to recoup money for investors if their broker goes under.

 SIPC holds there is no basis in law to refund people who lost money in the $7 billion Ponzi scheme set up by Allen Stanford, who is serving a 110-year jail sentence.

 The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) lost a court case in which it contested that decision, though an appeal in the case is still pending. A group of 14 senators and fraud victims are supporting the SEC's legal fight.

 "It seems that SIPC continues to prioritize protecting its Wall Street members by hiring lawyers to fight the SEC in court rather than protect investors," Vitter said in his letter.

 SIPC, created under the Securities Investor Protection Act (SIPA), is funded by Wall Street firms.

 Vitter also asked whether SIPC had received any outside funding for its legal defense, whether its decision had been influenced by the banks, and wanted to know whether Bowen had received any gifts while at SIPC.

 Bowen and two other nominees to the five-strong CFTC met little pushback in a Senate committee at a confirmation hearing on March 6, but it is no surprise that the Stanford scandal is coming to haunt Bowen. Thad Cochran, the highest-ranking Republican on the Committee, mentioned the scandal during the meeting, though he did not pursue the issue.

 The agency - down to just two Commissioners, one Democrat and one Republican - is facing a leadership vacuum just as it is implementing some of the most fundamental reforms of financial markets after the 2007-09 credit meltdown.

To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/




Thursday 27 March 2014

Distribution Schedules

In accordance with the Court’s May 30, 2013 Order Approving Receiver's Interim Distribution Plan, the Receiver has filed the following schedules of distribution payments with the United States District Court for the Northern District of Texas, Dallas Division. This page will be periodically updated with additional schedules that are filed on a rolling basis as responses to Certification Notices are received and processed.









To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/



Monday 10 March 2014

Stanford Ponzi Victims To Be Compensated

GENEVA — The office of Switzerland’s attorney general says its criminal investigation into former Texas tycoon R. Allen Stanford’s massive Ponzi scheme has concluded that some of the victims’ money was laundered in Swiss accounts.

 The office says the investigation since Feb. 2009 is completed and all of the assets remaining in Switzerland will be returned to fraud victims.

 It said Monday that Stanford Group (Suisse) AG was fined 1 million Swiss francs ($1.1 million) and ordered to pay between 6 million and 9 million francs in claims. It has provided American authorities with banking documents and hearing transcripts for use in U.S. criminal proceedings.

 The U.S. Supreme Court ruled last month that Stanford’s victims can go forward with class-action lawsuits against those that allegedly aided the $7.2 billion fraud.

To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/



Joint Liquidators Take Action Court Action


Antigua St. John's - The joint liquidators of the Stanford International Bank Ltd (SIBL) obtained authorisation from the Antiguan court to take back funds from holders of certificates of deposit (CDs).

According to a release, most of the victims are from Venezuela, other countries in Latin America, and the United States. They sent a letter asking for the return of money withdrawn from their accounts during the six months prior to the collapse of the SIBL, and demanded a response within 120 days of receipt of the letter.

COViSAL’s response can be read at: http://covisal.blogspot.com/2014/02/stanfords-victims-defrauded-again-by.html



According to the release, “families who had their life savings deposited at SIBL, were completely unaware of any problems the bank was having. There were no red flags or suspicious circumstances known to the depositors, who continued doing business with SIBL during its regular commercial operations until the bank closed its doors in 2009. It is a fact that the majority of depositors only became aware of trouble at SIBL when the SEC seized Stanford Financial Group on February 17, 2009.”

Covisal’s director said, “The withdrawals made from their savings during the six months prior to the closing of SIBL’s operations, were not ‘Preferential Payments,’ but legitimate withdrawals of part of the principal invested by the rightful owners of the money. These withdrawals were made rightfully and in good faith. Families withdrew part of their invested principal regularly to pay for living expenses, medical treatments, relatives in need, down payments, business expenses, etc.”



Families lost their livelihood in Stanford’s fraud; many sold their homes and what other assets they had left in order to survive for the past five years. The majority of depositors at SIBL are common people, families who worked very hard for 30-40 years to save money for their retirement, for a college fund for their children or grandchildren, and to have savings available for a medical emergency, among other things. Since the closing of SIBL in 2009, victims of the fraud have been living in dire straits; the Stanford fiasco destroyed their lives.



According to court records, the bank’s run might have happened the week of February 9, 2009 at the earliest.

According to the release, “If the management of SIBL permitted the redemption of CDs in the six months leading up to February 23, 2009, it was most likely their Preferred Customers who withdrew their money plus interest - unfairly prejudicial against all CD creditors and depositors at SIBL.”



The joint liquidators sent a summary of receipts and payments that shows receipts of $108.8 M as of December 31, 2013. Of this amount, $95.1 M was part of the $100 million that UK authorities confiscated following a request from the US Department of Justice on April 2009. The liquidators so far have spent $58.6 M. The release questioned, “Why are the expenses so vague and lacking in supportive evidence? What honest and transparent legal entity is providing oversight of the liquidation’s affairs? The real accomplishment of the Joint Liquidators seems to be in giving themselves ‘Preferential Payments’.”



The Open Letter from COViSAL to the Antiguan Court and the Joint Liquidators can be read here

To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/

Friday 7 March 2014

Where is the Stanford Ponzi loot? This is the man who knows



Victims of the massive Allen Stanford Ponzi scheme got a rare bit of good news Thursday. Some $18 million in Stanford funds that had been parked in Canada was returned to the U.S. for distribution to investors.

 But the payment is tiny in comparison to the $5 billion in actual losses from the scam, and the court-appointed receiver who has spent the past five years searching for Stanford's billions tells CNBC it is unlikely investors will ever recover much because for the most part, "the money is gone."

 "I think about the victims every day," Dallas attorney Ralph Janvey told CNBC in an exclusive interview, his first since being appointed five years ago.

 "They believed what they were told. And I will say publicly I don't think the victims should be blamed for anything," Janvey said. "They made an investment based on what they were told. What they were told was wrong and it was fraud."

 A federal judge placed Stanford's global financial empire in receivership—and under Janvey's control—after the Securities and Exchange Commission filed suit in 2009. The suit accused Stanford of running "a fraud of shocking magnitude" based on bogus certificates of deposit.

 Stanford's brokers sold the CDs—issued by his offshore bank in Antigua and Barbuda—to investors around the world. But a federal jury found in 2012 that most of the funds went to support Stanford's lavish lifestyle. Stanford is serving a 110-year prison sentence, and appealing his conviction on 13 criminal counts. 

Comparisons to Madoff Ponzi scheme

 Since taking over as receiver, Janvey has been searching the world for assets as well as enduring frequent comparisons to the much more successful recovery effort in the Bernard Madoff Ponzi scheme.

 "I don't minimize the Madoff fraud and I don't want to minimize the Madoff tragedy," Janvey said. "But Stanford was much more complicated."

 That is reflected in the fact that while Janvey's counterpart in the Madoff case—trustee Irving Picard—has said investors could eventually recoup all of their principal. Janvey says the best case scenario for Stanford investors is "pennies on the dollar."

 So far, Stanford's 28,000 victims—more than 10 times the number of victims in the Madoff case—have received next to nothing. Janvey received court approval last year to begin making his first distribution to clients. The $55 million being paid out amounts to less than one penny on the dollar.

 To date, Janvey says, he has recovered only about $263 million. But nearly half of that—around $120 million—has been eaten up by expenses including $57 million just to wind down Stanford's global operations including 130 companies and 3,000 employees in 30 countries. Janvey says the money, including fees for him and a team of experts, "had to be spent" because of the complexity of the fraud.

 "Stanford was spending $33 million a month on expenses," Janvey said. "We had to shut that down. It's also going to litigation; with the goal being what we spend is to bring money back into receivership to distribute to the victims."

Who Kept Allen Stanford's Money?




Janvey has filed dozens of lawsuits seeking more than $680 million from banks, law firms, politicians and charities that benefited from Stanford's largess. For the most part, they have been unwilling to give any of the money back.
"We had to sue the Democratic and Republican committees to get back over a million dollars.That shouldn't happen," Janvey said.
It took a federal appeals court ruling last year to get the campaign contributions returned, after the committees challenged Janvey's standing to claw back the money.
"Stanford had no right to give the money for political contributions, and they had no right to give it away," Janvey said. "We have other politicians who still have money who haven't given it to us yet."
They include President Barack Obama's 2008 presidential campaign, which received $4,600, according to court filings, and Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell, R-Ky., who received $2,500. Janvey said the amounts are too small to justify the cost of litigation.
"Another example is the University of Miami," Janvey said. "They got $6 million to do a study of fish and coral in Antigua. That did not help the victims. That money should come back to the receivership estate so it can be distributed to the victims."
A university spokeswoman declined to comment.
Stanford's Ponzi scheme: Who was Allen Stanford?



anvey is also a party in suits against five banks that did business with Stanford, alleging they knew or should have known about the fraud.
"They were on notice and they did nothing about it. And they enabled that fraud to go on for years and years and years," he said.
The cases are similar to allegations against Madoff's primary banker—JPMorgan Chase—which earlier this year agreed to pay more than $2 billion to head off criminal charges. But Stanford's banks, HSBC, Societe Generale, Toronto Dominion, Trustmark and Bank of Houston, have all moved to dismiss the allegations. Janvey said the Justice Department should be investigating Stanford's banks the way it did with Madoff's.
"I would encourage the government to look at the banks," Janvey said. "We are here to assist them if they want our assistance."
Further frustrating Janvey's efforts is the fact that the Securities Investor Protection Corporation (SIPC) has refused to provide coverage to Stanford victims—another contrast to the Madoff case, where the SIPC has not only paid victims but also covered the trustee's expenses.
Money hidden offshore?
Stanford's deep political connections as well as rumors—mostly cultivated by him—that he worked as a government informant have led to speculation he may have some money hidden offshore. But Janvey says that is not the case.
"And we've looked. It's one of the things we did in the early days of the receivership. It doesn't exist," he said. "We've traced the money. The money is gone. And that's very frustrating for the victims, I understand that. But the money was gone before we came in."
Janvey says the money that was not redeemed by Stanford investors "went to his spending."
"He had to buy the reputation that he—quote—'earned,' and he used victims' money to get there."
Some $208 million is frozen in Swiss banks, with about two-thirds of the money to go into the receivership controlled by Janvey, and the rest to go to court-appointed liquidators in Antigua. But much of that money is contingent on Stanford's criminal appeal. Stanford, who is representing himself, recently filed a motion from prison asking for another six months to file his initial brief.
Janvey estimates it will take another five years of litigation before he has exhausted his recovery efforts.
Since the scandal broke in 2009, 67 Stanford clients have died.
To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/


Thursday 6 March 2014

Grant Thornton Distribution Process & Forms

On 20 January 2014, the agreement reached by the Joint Liquidators (“JLs”) of Stanford International Bank (“SIB”) and ItalBank International, Inc. (“ItalBank”) to act as distribution agent for the dividend payments of SIB to its creditors was announced. As a first step in this process, we need to collect the payment preferences of creditors.

Through ItalBank, you can choose to receive payments by bank transfer to an account in your name, your Trust name or your company name. We will not make payments to third parties, but rather, only to the same name in which accounts were held with SIB. The JLs will also offer the option of U.S. dollar checks to the same name registered in the accounts with SIB and mailed to the mailing address listed on your proof of debt form.

For those with trust accounts who wish for the settlors to be paid rather than the Trust, please contact stanford.enquires@uk.gt.com for a Deed of Revocation Order, to revoke the trust.
 If you would prefer to open a new account, we gladly invite you to become a client of ItalBank.

Once you have reviewed our information please choose one of the following options:


  • I wish to receive my payments in an account in my name or the name of my company, in a bank located in the United States of America. Click Here to Download Form.
  • I wish to receive my payments in an account in my name or the name of my company, in a bank located in one of the countries of the European Union. *All payments will be made in U.S. dollars. Click Here to Download Form.
  • I wish to receive my payments in an account in my name or the name of my company, in a bank located in another country (excluding the U.S. or the European Union). Click Here to Download Form.
  • Payment Instructions (Wire) Click Here to Download.
  • Payment Instructions (Checks) Click Here to Download.
  • I would like to open an Individual Account in ItalBank.
  • I would like to open a Commercial Account in ItalBank.
  • I would like to receive a check in USD, to my proof of debt mailing address.



ItalBank International Information:

ItalBank International is registered in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico since 2008 and holds a license issued by the Office of the Commissioner of Financial Institutions of Puerto Rico (OCFI) to operate as an International Banking Entity (IBE), under the “International Banking Center Law” and subject to all applicable federal banking laws and regulations of the United States. ItalBank is a financial institution focused on the Latin American market. Its headquarters are located in San Juan, Puerto Rico. ItalBank serves Latin American clients who want to protect their savings, having them deposited in a U.S. bank, while enjoying first class banking services.

Products

ItalBank offers personal and companies current accounts, certificates of deposit (CD´s), international credit cards, trade and investment finance.

Services

Our services include online banking, through which customers can access their balances, transaction history, make requests to transfer of funds and access the “Cash Management” module in the case of companies. All our personal accounts include a free MasterCard debit card and have no monthly limit international bank transfers.

To learn more, we include a presentation and we also invite you to visit our website at http://www.italbank.com

To join the debate click here. 

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/


Saturday 1 March 2014

Grant Thornton Notice to Creditors

NOTICE TO CREDITORS 

25 February 2014

Dear Creditor:

Stanford International Bank Limited - in Liquidation ("the Company") 
Re: Notice of Declaration 

The Joint Liquidators are now in a position to make a first interim distribution in the amount of $0.01 on the dollar. CD holders with claims allowed below EC$20,000 (US$7,407.40) will be paid out in full in accordance with section 289 of the International Business Corporations Act.

If you received a preference payment, for which you will have been notified separately, your distribution will be held back until the Court makes a final determination.

Please see the below summary of the receipts and payments covering the period of the liquidation to 31 December 2013 from which you will see that the total amount to be immediately distributed is US$33,262,396 with a further US$16,989,510 being held back pending resolution by the Court of the preference issue.

The balance in hand of US$15,344,780 is retained for future costs, fees and expenses of the liquidation, including employee and vendor claims. We expect to pay a further dividend in the future. However, the quantum and timing at this stage is unknown due to the uncertainty of future realisations.

Yours sincerely
For and on behalf of Stanford International Bank Limited

Marcus Wide and Hugh Dickson
Joint Liquidators



STANFORD INTERNATIONAL BANK LIMITED (IN LIQUIDATION)
Receipts and payments statement account As of 31 Dec 2013

Receipts (USD) 

  Balance received from former Liquidators                                                     NIL
  UK recoveries                                                                                             95,111,096
  3rd Party Funding (Hamilton)                                                                        5,001,000
  ECAB building sale process                                                                          4,537,037
  HSBC , Panama                                                                                            3,275,228
  Rental receipt (ECAB building)                                                                        255,556
  Settled legal claims                                                                                          249,930
  Settlement on pricing error                                                                              230,710
  Other receipts                                                                                                  167,225
                                                                                                                     ----------------
                                                                                                                     108,827,782

Less: Cost Awarded for removal of former liquidators                                 (3,185,338)
                                                                                                                      ---------------

Total Receipts                                                                                            105,642,444

Payments
  Liquidators fees & expenses                                                                        7,446,658
  Co-lead legal advisors fees and expenses                                                  10,745,246
  Other legal advisors fees and expenses                                                      12,687,197
  Other advisors fees                                                                                       1,722,896
  Other operational expenses                                                                           7,443,761
                                                                                                                     ----------------
Total Payments                                                                                           40,045,758
                                                                                                                     ----------------
                                                                                                                     ----------------
 Balance on Hand                                                                                       65,596,686 
                                                                                                                      ==========

Represented by:
  Preference Payment holdback                                                                    16,989,510
  1st Distribution to Investors                                                                         33,262,396
  Balance carried forward                                                                              15,344,780
                                                                                                                       ----------------
                                                                                                                        65,596,686
                                                                                                                      =========

To join the debate click here. 


For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/


Thursday 27 February 2014

Kachroo Legal Services Update on SEC Lawsuit

TO ALL SEC CLIENTS
February 26, 2014

 Zelaya et al v. United States of America

 Dear Stanford/SEC Clients: We write to update you with respect to important information regarding the claim against the Securities and Exchange Commission.

 To read the complete update from Kachroo Legal Services Click Here:  

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/



Kachroo Legal Services Update on Stanford Further Actions

TO ALL SFA CLIENTS

STANFORD FURTHER ACTIONS 

 Dear Stanford Clients:

 We write to update you with respect to important information regarding customer claims with the Stanford Liquidator in Antigua and Receiver in Dallas.

To read the complete update from Kachroo Legal Services Click Here:  

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/


Justices Throw a Rope to Stanford Ponzi Victims

WASHINGTON (CN) - Federal law does not preclude investors allegedly defrauded by R. Allen Stanford's $7 billion Ponzi scheme from attempting recovery via state class actions, the Supreme Court ruled Wednesday.

 For nearly 15 years, Stanford Group Co. and related entities sold certificates of deposit issued by its Antigua-based Stanford International Bank, and then used investor funds to cover its liabilities.

 Its eponymous leader was sentenced in 2012 to 110 years in federal prison after a federal jury in Houston, Texas, convicted him on 13 of 14 counts of conspiracy, wire fraud and mail fraud.

Read the full transcript from the Courthouse News Service here

 For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/


SLUSA - The full Court Ruling

Great news for ALL victims! With the SLUSA ruling going in favour of the victims all the FROZEN court cases can now proceed.

To view the full court ruling on SLUSA click Here

For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/


Wednesday 26 February 2014

U.S. Justices say Allen Stanford Victim Lawsuits can go Forward



(Reuters) - The Supreme Court on Wednesday ruled that lawyers, insurance brokers and others who worked with convicted swindler Allen Stanford cannot avoid lawsuits by investors seeking to recoup losses incurred in his $7 billion Ponzi scheme.

On a 7-2 vote the court held that lawsuits filed in state court can go forward. New York-based law firms Chadbourne & Parke and Proskauer Rose and insurance brokerage Willis Group Holdings Plc were all sued by former Stanford investors. The investors also sued financial services firm SEI Investments and insurance company Bowen, Miclette & Britt.

Writing for the majority, Justice Stephen Breyer said the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act did not prevent the state lawsuits from proceeding. The law says that state lawsuits are barred when the alleged misrepresentations are "in connection with" the purchase or sale of a covered security.

As the defendants in the case were not selling securities traded on U.S. exchanges, "it is difficult to see why the federal securities laws would be - or should be - concerned with shielding such entities from lawsuits," he wrote.

The defendants sought Supreme Court review after the New Orleans-based 5th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in March 2012 said the lawsuits brought under state laws by the former Stanford clients could go ahead.

The former Stanford clients are keen to pursue state law claims because the Supreme Court has previously held that similar so-called "aiding and abetting" claims cannot be made under federal law.
The class action lawsuits filed by the former investors accused Thomas Sjoblom, a lawyer who worked at both law firms, of obstructing a Securities and Exchange Commission probe into Stanford, and sought to hold the other defendants responsible as well.

The Obama administration, representing the SEC, sided with the defendants over the interpretation of the state law in an avowed effort to protect the agency's own authority to pursue wide-ranging investigations.

The administration pointed out that the "in connection with" language in SLUSA that limits state court lawsuits mirrors language in federal law that gives broad authority of the SEC to pursue such misrepresentations. Therefore, the administration urged the court to give the phrase a broad interpretation.

Stanford's fraud involved the sale of certificates of deposit by his Antigua-based Stanford International Bank. Much of the litigation centers on whether these qualified as securities under applicable laws.

The cases are Chadbourne & Parke LLP v. Troice et al, U.S. Supreme Court. No. 12-79; Willis of Colorado Inc et al v. Troice et al, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 12-86; and Proskauer Rose LLP v. Troice et al, U.S. Supreme Court, No. 12-88.

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Monday 24 February 2014

Joint Comments by the U.S. Receiver, the Examiner and the Official Stanford Investors Committee Concerning the Liquidators' Efforts to Recover Preference Payments

Joint Comments by the U.S. Receiver, the Examiner and the Official Stanford Investors Committee Concerning the Liquidators' Efforts to Recover Preference Payments - The U.S. Receiver, the Examiner, and the Official Stanford Investors Committee understand that certain SIBL CD investors have received letters or emails from Marcus Wide and Hugh Dickson, the Joint Liquidators appointed by the Antiguan courts to oversee the Antiguan liquidation of SIBL, through which the Joint Liquidators seek to recover from the investors certain amounts (referred to as "preference payments") that the investors had withdrawn or otherwise received from SIBL during the 6 months' prior to the failure of SIBL. We also understand that these letters and/or emails are causing considerable distress and concern among SIBL CD investors. We wish to clarify the following matters:

1.The U.S. Receiver, the Examiner, and the Official Stanford Investors Committee have no involvement in the Joint Liquidators' effort to recover these "preference payments." The Joint Liquidators are proceeding pursuant to Antiguan law and with the approval of the Antiguan courts. Similarly, the U.S. District Court overseeing the Stanford Receivership has no role in or jurisdiction over the Joint Liquidators' efforts to recover these "preference payments."

2.The Antiguan Joint Liquidators have posted a set of Frequently Asked Questions concerning their effort to recover "preference payments" on their website. You can review those Frequently Asked Questions at http://www.sibliquidation.com

3.We understand that the Antiguan court has established a process for objecting to the Joint Liquidators' effort to recover these "preference payments." In the first instance, any objections must be directed to the Joint Liquidators at Stanford.enquiries@uk.gt.com. Objections must be filed within 120 days after the investor receives the letter or email asserting the Joint Liquidators' claim for these "preference payments."

4.At present, the Joint Liquidators are not permitted to bring lawsuits in the United States to recover these "preference payments," nor for any other purpose.

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For a full and open debate on the Stanford Receivership visit the Stanford International Victims Group – SIVG official forum http://sivg.org.ag/