Showing posts with label gaurdian. Show all posts
Showing posts with label gaurdian. Show all posts

Wednesday, 1 February 2012

Stanford's bank loaned him money for real estate investments.

Terri Langfor, San Antonio Express-News

HOUSTON — R. Allen Stanford received several hundred million dollars in loans from his Caribbean bank as he expanded his real estate holdings, and as investors he wooed in the U.S. and elsewhere deposited billions in the bank, a business associate testified Tuesday.

The government charges that although depositors were assured by Stanford and his associates that the CDs were safe and that the bank did not make loans, $7 billion in investors' money went to Stanford's pet business projects and lavish lifestyle.

On Tuesday, federal prosecutors zeroed in how the Mexia native began branching into real estate ventures, searching for projects for “high net” people, while he was loaning himself money from Stanford International.

Federal prosecutors introduced two promissory notes signed by Stanford, indicating the bank loaned him $168 million in 2002 and $330 million in 2003. Neither loan was listed on the bank's annual statements for those years.

Stanford defense attorney Robert Scardino noted several times during the proceedings that no law required disclosure of the loans.

They surfaced during the testimony of Arnold Knoche, an accountant with construction experience, hired in 1987 to head up what would become Stanford Development Co.

When it began, Stanford wanted to buy up distressed property in Houston, renovate it and then sell it. The projects would be funded by clients at Stanford's first bank, Guardian International Bank in Montserrat. Clients invested in the first project, but the bank couldn't to get enough client funding for the other two, Knoche said.

Stanford told Knoche he would make up the shortfall with personal resources.

During the 1990s, Knoche said, the development company shifted its focus to Stanford's commercial projects in Antigua.

Stanford took out the two loans during construction of major projects there — a restaurant, private airplane hanger, a new bank building and a cricket field.

In an undated video played in court Tuesday, Stanford told associates at a meeting that the projects would attract wealthy people. “The richest people in the world that we bring down here will be impressed,” Stanford said.

Knoche also said Stanford's insistence on lavish materials pushed up construction costs. He said Stanford once ordered the hardwood floors at the bank in Antigua replaced because they were “too light a shade.”

Knoche testified that as early as 2003, six years before U.S. regulators forced Stanford's businesses into receivership, he was concerned about Stanford's speculative investments in Caribbean resort real estate.

The prosecution's star witness, former Stanford Chief Financial Officer James Davis, is expected to testify starting today or Thursday. Davis, Stanford's former Baylor University roommate, has pleaded guilty to three felony counts.

Thursday, 26 January 2012

Ex-Stanford employee tells jurors he saw problems

Published January 25, 2012

HOUSTON – A former employee of Texas financier R. Allen Stanford told jurors at Stanford's fraud trial Wednesday that he believes he saw the former billionaire making up accounting figures used in an annual report to woo investors.

Leo Mejia, who worked for an advertising company created by Stanford to promote his various businesses, testified that he became uneasy working for the financier because he lost confidence in the accuracy of financial information he was given to include in advertising materials.

Mejia testified that one of his responsibilities was to help put together the bank's annual report, which was used to promote the bank and attract new customers. He said that when he was preparing the bank's 1988 annual report, he saw Stanford and his chief financial officer, James Davis, use a calculator to make various faulty changes to figures related to the bank's finances just before the report was sent off to be printed.

"Did you notice any problem with the numbers Stanford was getting by punching into the calculator?" prosecutor Gregg Costa asked Mejia.

"Yes. When I was working I noticed very easily that some of those numbers didn't add up correctly. I mentioned they didn't add up. They laughed and corrected those numbers," Mejia said.

At the time, the bank was in Caribbean island nation of Montserrat. It later moved to neighbouring Antigua.

Mejia described the errors he saw as an "obvious mistake. Like nine plus one does not give you five."

Davis has pleaded guilty in the case and is expected to testify against Stanford.

Mejia also told jurors he was surprised that after those figures were submitted to the bank's auditor, they were approved and sent back to him in 15 minutes.

"It took me more to do my checkbook. I thought that was quick," he said.

Prosecutors allege Stanford bribed the auditor as well as Antiguan regulators to hide the true condition of the bank's financial health and promote the fraud.

Mejia also told jurors Stanford described investors as "greedy" and that the bank's office in Montserrat was mostly an empty building that had a couple of computers that were not plugged in. Mejia said he was fired in 1992 for receiving an overpayment of $750.

The prosecution's first witness, Michelle Chambliess, who had worked for Stanford selling CDs to investors, testified earlier Wednesday that she had also become uneasy with how the financier ran the bank, including using deposits for personal loans. She also said the bank's insurance policy was from a company set up by Stanford.

Ali Fazel, one of Stanford's attorneys, tried to suggest to jurors that both Mejia and Chambliess, who was also fired, were not experts in the complexities of the financier's various businesses and were not qualified to assess if there was any wrongdoing.

"You're just guessing? You're just speculating?" Your entire testimony is speculation," Fazel told Mejia.

Stanford Invented Insurance Company for Bank Depositors, Prosecutor Says

By Andrew Harris and Laurel Brubaker Calkins - Jan 25, 2012 10:43 PM GMT-0400
R. Allen Stanford failed to tell a financial adviser he hired for his first offshore bank that the insurer he selected for the institution was a company he created, a federal prosecutor said at the financier’s investment fraud trial.

Assistant U.S. Attorney William Stellmach made that claim today while questioning the adviser, Michelle Chambliess, on the first day of testimony at the federal courthouse in Houston.

Chambliess said she was one of Stanford’s first hires in 1987, at Guardian International Investment Services, a U.S.- based sibling of Stanford’s Montserrat-based Guardian International Bank Ltd. Guardian was the precursor to Stanford International Bank Ltd., the Antiguan entity at the heart of Stanford’s alleged $7 billion fraud.

Stanford told her he’d obtained insurance for the bank from a carrier called British Insurance Fund Ltd., which appeared to be an independent U.K.-based company.

“Did he ever tell you it was a shell company he had set up?” Stellmach asked.

“No,” Chambliess replied.

‘Any Difference’
“Would that have made any difference to you?” he asked.

“Absolutely,” she said. “Then there wouldn’t be insurance.”

The Guardian bank later moved to Antigua, where it was renamed. Stanford is charged with wire fraud and mail fraud, crimes that carry maximum sentences of 20 years in prison, as well as obstruction of an SEC investigation. U.S. District Judge David Hittner has said the trial may last about six weeks.

Stanford, 61, told the jury yesterday he isn’t guilty. Today, wearing a double-breasted navy suit and a light blue shirt, he occasionally pursed his lips and shook his head as he watched his ex-employees testify against him.

The bank’s offshore location made it a tax haven for depositors and removed it from U.S. regulatory oversight and the backing of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp., Chambliess testified. Its money-market accounts and certificates of deposit offered higher rates of return than those of banks required to comply with U.S. reserve regulations and tax laws, she said.

Fired in 2002
The financial adviser said she was fired in 2002, after working for Stanford for almost 15 years, when she lost her three largest clients and her CD sales dropped. By that time, she said, she had already started circulating her resume because Stanford had told her to “do whatever you need to do” to land a client.

That advice left her “flabbergasted,” she testified.

Chambliess told the court she learned that Stanford and some of his businesses borrowed money from the bank from a disclosure in Stanford’s 1996 annual report. She said she was surprised by the loans, as Stanford had promised investors and employees that the bank didn’t make commercial loans and invested solely in high-grade liquid assets.

The document said the financier personally borrowed $13.5 million while two affiliated companies borrowed an additional $11 million. When she asked about the loans, Chambliess said Stanford replied that he’d guaranteed the loans with his own liquid assets “and there was no risk” it wouldn’t be repaid.

Annual Report
The ex-employee said a disclosure in the company’s 1998 annual report indicated Stanford repaid the personal loan in full, along with $480,000 interest.

She said there were no subsequent disclosures of lending to Stanford or any of his companies and that financial advisers weren’t told Stanford continued to invest depositor funds in outside ventures ranging from regional airlines to newspapers.

Employees believed “the bank’s money stayed at the bank” in the conservative, highly liquid portfolio advertised to investors, Chambliess testified.

Under questioning by defense lawyer Ali Fazel, Chambliess said the Caribbean bank was subject to different international accounting standards than what U.S. companies are required to follow.

Under the international rules, Fazel said, the bank didn’t need to disclose its loans to Stanford and his companies.

Key Theme
Fazel revisited a key defense theme with Chambliess, that none of Stanford’s investors lost money until U.S. regulators seized his operations and destroyed their value.

“Was there anybody who did not get paid their money when the CDs were due?” Fazel asked Chambliess.

“Not while I was there,” she replied.

Leonel Mejia, who Stanford hired to head a captive advertising and marketing business called Idea Advertising in 1988, testified he was asked by James Davis, chief financial officer of the securities brokerage Stanford Group Co., to alter the coverage dates of an expired copy of a British Insurance Fund document.

Mejia said he declined to do so because he believed he was tampering with a legal document. Davis asked Mejia if he’d make the changes with permission from the owner of the British insurer. When he agreed, Davis and Stanford showed him papers indicating Stanford owned the insurance company, Mejia said.

CD Rates
Mejia, an El Salvador native, also testified that Stanford purposely set his bank CD rates two to four percentage points higher than U.S. rates to attract investors willing to forgo FDIC insurance on their deposits to get a better return.

“He said that people were willing to risk their money for 2 percent, they’re greedy,” Mejia said. “It was not very respectful to his clients, in my opinion.”

Mejia also testified that Stanford and Davis changed numbers in the bank’s 1988 annual report using a handheld calculator. The bank’s auditor in Antigua signed off on the revised numbers by fax 15 minutes later.

“It took me more time to do my checkbook,” Mejia said of the auditor’s rapid approval. “I thought that was quick.”

Questioned by Fazel, Mejia said he didn’t know if Stanford and Davis were consulting with the auditor and accountants in another room when they changed the annual report numbers.

“You’re speculating and guessing about everything, aren’t you,” Fazel asked Mejia. While disagreeing with that assertion, Mejia conceded that his knowledge of Stanford’s financial empire was limited.

The case is U.S. v. Stanford, 09-cr-342, U.S. District Court, Southern District of Texas (Houston).

Saturday, 4 June 2011

The Stanford Timeline

1985 Robert Allen Stanford starts Guardian International Bank on the Caribbean island of Montserrat with $6 million in seed money from an unknown source.

Mid-1990s Stanford is asked by government officials in Montserrat to leave the country. He relocates the bank to Antigua and names it Stanford International Bank.

1996 Jay Comeaux, Alvaro Trullenque and their investment team leave Merrill Lynch with the Stanford account to start Stanford Group Company in City Plaza.

1998 Stanford begins selling its disputed certificates of deposit.

1999 Stanford Group Company receives a negative annual supervisory review in which the Securities and Exchange Commission finds that some advisers' actions are inconsistent with the investors' intentions.

1999 The Justice Department tells the SEC to stand down in an investigation on Stanford.

2001 The first known complaint regarding Stanford's referral fees is filed with the SEC.

2002 The first known letter from a Stanford insider in Antigua is sent to the SEC detailing the alleged Ponzi scheme.

2003 A complaint is filed with the National Association of Securities Dealers in regards to misleading materials for the CDs.

2006 Regulators require that Stanford modify its CD Disclosure Statement.

2007 NASD fines Stanford $20,000 for failing to "establish and maintain a supervisory system reasonably designed to achieve compliance with applicable securities laws." Later, the Financial Industry Regulatory Agency fines Stanford $10,000 for distributing literature that "failed to disclose a conflict of interest" between advisers and the bank and also for a failure to present "fair and balanced treatment of the risks and potential benefits of a CD investment."

2008 FINRA fines the Stanford Group Company $10,000 for a failure to properly report customer transactions.

2008 FINRA fines Stanford Group $30,000 for a failure to disclose adviser compensation in published research reports.

2008 Alex Dalmady's Duck Tales blog details Stanford's possible Ponzi scheme.

February 2009 Federal regulators storm the Houston offices of Stanford Financial Group and issue a freeze on all of the companies and their associated assets.

March 2009 Ten Louisiana investors who lost millions sue their financial advisers, arguing that the men misrepresented the investment products they sold.

June 2009 Stanford and six others are indicted and jailed on charges the international banking empire was really just a $7 billion Ponzi scheme built on lies, bluster and bribery. If convicted of all charges in the 21-count indictment, Stanford could face as much as 250 years in prison.

July 2009 Stanford and his co-defendants ask for the delay of an August trial, citing the complexity of the case; the government does not oppose the request.

January 2011 A federal judge again postpones the criminal trial because Stanford needs to be weaned off an anti-anxiety drug prescribed for him in prison and undergo more tests to determine his competency. His lawyers seek a two-year delay.

February 2011 Stanford files a lawsuit seeking $7.2 billion in damages, claiming that U.S. prosecutors "undertook illegal tactics" in their investigation. He contends that the federal government used more than $51 million of his assets to pursue the cases against him. One month later, he drops the allegations.

May 2011 The U.S. Department of Justice issues a superceding indictment against Stanford, who now faces a total of 14 counts on conspiracy to commit wire fraud and mail fraud, wire fraud, mail fraud, conspiracy to obstruct an SEC investigation, obstruction of an SEC investigation and conspiracy to commit money laundering. U.S. District Judge David Hittner signs an order setting Stanford's trial for Sept. 12.

Monday, 23 May 2011

State may have missed Stanford clue

R. Allen Stanford used to tell prospective investors in the U.S. that he could pay higher interest rates because his Caribbean bank was free of expensive U.S. banking regulations.

Investors outside the U.S. got a different pitch: Put your money with us and enjoy all the protections of a U.S. financial institution.

Neither, of course, was true.

Federal authorities now claim that the interest rates were a sham, part of a massive $7 billion Ponzi scheme. Stanford, who has denied wrongdoing and is awaiting trial this fall, didn't have any U.S. financial institutions, either, but he did have a unique state-chartered trust company in Texas that could have given regulators insight into Stanford's activities had anyone bothered to look.

Members of Congress recently held hearings into the regulatory failures that allowed Stanford's alleged scheme to flourish for so long. But the scrutiny of federal regulators has overlooked questions of how Texas regulators also missed signs that something was amiss with Stanford.

Some of the earliest red flags about Stanford came from the Texas Department of Banking. In 1991, the department moved to shut down the Houston and El Paso offices of Stanford's Guardian International Bank. In a letter to Stanford's father, James, who was Guardian's chairman, the department threatened to file charges for violating the state's banking code because Guardian's Texas offices kept operating even after authorities in the British territory of Montserrat, where Guardian was based, revoked the bank's charter.

After Guardian was shut down, Stanford regrouped on another Caribbean island, Antigua, where he founded Stanford International Bank.

In 2000, Stanford approached the banking commission again, this time to set up a state-chartered trust company.

In granting approval, the commission also established a unique agreement by which Texas and Antiguan regulators would share information about Stanford's operations.

"Our goal is coordinated, comprehensive supervision," then-banking commissioner Randall James said in a news release at the time.

A year earlier, the U.S. Treasury Department had issued an advisory to U.S. banks urging them to scrutinize any transactions involving Antigua because the island nation had become a money-laundering haven.

Questions on cooperation
Indeed, by then the FBI and Great Britain's Scotland Yard had begun investigating Stanford's Caribbean activities, according to British newspaper reports.

That same year, Texas securities regulators forwarded concerns about possible money laundering by Stanford International to the FBI and the Securities and Exchange Commission, former Texas Securities Commissioner Denise Voigt-Crawford later testified. No action was ever taken.

Stanford had a similar trust operation in Miami, but it lacked the information-sharing agreement that the Texas charter had.

As the Stanford case has unfolded during the past two years, investigators have complained about a lack of cooperation from Antiguan authorities. The court-appointed receiver in Dallas even squared off in court with his Antiguan counterpart over who has the authority to recover funds for investors.

It's not clear if Texas banking regulators ever actually received information from Antigua.

A lawyer for the commission confirmed the agreement, but asked that I file a public records request for any details on what may have been exchanged.

I'll let you know what I get back in a later column.

Accuracy at issue
Another lawyer involved in the case told me that even if information was shared, it may not have been accurate.

Little of the financial information Stanford disclosed ever was, and Stanford allegedly managed to bamboozle regulators in the U.S. and Antigua for years.

The trust arrangement, though, was designed to prevent exactly that sort of deception.

It was supposed to allow Texas regulators to see inside Stanford's Caribbean operations. Instead, it was just another safeguard that failed to protect investors.