The campaign is finally gaining momentum among the domestic US investors, with a substantial number of investors from Louisiana, Texas, and now Florida, having now having signed-up and submitting FTCA claims against the US Government Securities and Exchange Commission, for their negligence in failing to close down Allen Stanford sooner, knowing for 13 years he was likely operating a Ponzi scheme. Had they done so, many investors of the failed Stanford International Bank, a part of the Stanford Financial Group, now in receivership, may have been spared the loss of their life savings.
Allen Stanford is currently in detention in Houston, Texas, awaiting trial on 23 counts of fraud.
The deadline for FTCA claims against the US Securities and Exchange Commission is approaching fast. This is a real possibility for full recovery of losses sustained by all the Stanford investors, irrespective of nationality or place of residence. All valid claims must be submitted correctly and timely before the 16th February 2011 deadline when the Statute of Limitations expires.
Any investors who have not consulted an attorney to submit their claims should do so without delay. Although the forms look straightforward enough, there is a plethora of case-law awaiting the unwary.
Please ensure that the attorney you engage is willing to litigate your claim forward, should it be rejected or otherwise ineligible, and already has experience of submitting FTCA claims.
Please contact your attorney without delay, or the attorney hired by the Stanford International Victims Group: Kachroo Legal Services, Cambridge, Mass., who already have extensive experience of submitting FTCA claims for the Madoff investors. Email:info@kachroolegal.com
Should any Stanford investors wish for more detail of the campaign and the various arguments, please register for our free investors forum, which is available only to bona-fide investors in the failed Stanford Financial Group: http://svg.creatuforo.com/profile.php?mode=register
Showing posts with label Florida. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Florida. Show all posts
Saturday, 22 January 2011
Tuesday, 6 July 2010
Tuesday, 5 January 2010
Stanford's Lawyer Played Key Role In Shielding Banker From Scrutiny
We told you arlier today about Yolanda Suarez, the Florida lawyer who forged ties with members of Congress and ran interference with journalists on behalf of Allen Stanford. But it's also worth paying attention to another Florida lawyer and key Stanford ally, who appears to have played an equally crucial role in allowing the Texas banker -- who was charged in June with orchestrating a multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme -- to stay a step ahead of the government for so long.
As Stanford's lawyer of choice, Carlos Loumiet helped set up the unusual regulatory arrangement that allowed the Stanford Financial Group (SFG) to move hundreds of millions of dollars from Florida to Antigua with little scrutiny. Soon afterwards, he served on a Stanford-funded task-force to rewrite Antigua's banking laws -- an effort that U.S. regulators have said left major loopholes and hindered efforts to crack down on fraud. And the court-appointed receiver seeking to unravel Stanford's far-flung financial empire has demanded that the two law firms that have employed Loumiet -- who hasn't been charged with any wrongdoing -- hand over records of their work on behalf of Stanford.
As the Miami Herald reported earlier this year, the story starts in 1998, when Stanford wanted to set up an easy way to move money from SFG's Miami office, which sold certificates of deposit to investors, to Antigua, where his banking empire was headquartered.
He turned to Loumiet, at the time a lawyer at Greenberg Traurig. That's the Miami firm where Suarez, then SFG's legal counsel, had previously worked, and which would later become known as the firm from which Jack Abramoff bribed government officials. As the Herald has also reported, despite the objections of the state's top banking lawyer, Loumiet prevailed on Florida officials to allow SFG to set up a special trust office that could move money to Antigua without submitting to fraud or money -laundering checks. With the money pipeline established, the Herald reported, the Miami office sold millions in CDs over the next decade, then used jets to fly the checks, stuffed in pouches, to Antigua.
That wasn't the end of Loumiet's service to Stanford though. About a year later, the Clinton administration, as part of an effort to crack down on money laundering, was considering cutting off access to U.S. currency for all offshore institutions in Antigua.
In order to convince U.S. regulators to back off, Stanford volunteered to organize and fund a task force to re-write Antigua's banking laws -- allowing him to appoint the task force's members. Stanford named Loumiet and another Greenberg lawyer, Patrick O'Brien.
Loumiet touts the experience in the bio on his law firm website. But the revised laws that he and his fellow panelists drew up were denounced by the U.S. government as containing loopholes that made it even harder than previously for regulators to access bank records. In a letter to the Antiguan Prime Minister, the Treasury Department complained that the island nation had "weakened its anti-money laundering laws to the point they are now significantly below international standards, making Antigua more vulnerable to money laundering."
In an interview with the Washington Post at the time, Loumiet defended Stanford and suggested the U.S. and Britain did not have Antigua's best interests at heart. "Allen Stanford did not feel that if this was done with the benevolent help of the U.S. and Britain it would help Antigua," he said. "They were trying to put the fox in charge of the chicken coop, and frankly the chickens weren't very happy about it."
In any case, the panel had done its job. Stanford's operation continued largely free from regulatory scrutiny.
But Stanford still appears to have taken pains to keep Loumiet involved. When, in 2001, the lawyer moved from Greenberg to Hunton & Williams, where he remains, Stanford switched to the new firm and continued to use Loumiet as a lawyer.
That wasn't all Stanford used Loumiet's new firm for. Since 2000, Stanford Financial Group, like many large companies, had hired lobbyists to promote its interests in Washington. But, according to lobbying disclosure reports, Hunton was hired in 2005 to lobby Congress on tax issues, on behalf of Stanford personally. A spokeswoman for the firm declined to discuss what the work consisted of.
The court-appointed receiver on the Stanford case, Ralph Janvey, appears to see Loumiet's work as central to the operation. Janvey has asked both Greenberg and Hunton for files containing records of their work for Stanford. Hunton has handed over some files, but is fighting to keep others secret, citing legal issues regarding jurisdiction and client privilege.
A request to Loumiet from TPMmuckraker to discuss his work on behalf of Stanford was referred to a Hunton spokeswoman, who declined to comment.
As Stanford's lawyer of choice, Carlos Loumiet helped set up the unusual regulatory arrangement that allowed the Stanford Financial Group (SFG) to move hundreds of millions of dollars from Florida to Antigua with little scrutiny. Soon afterwards, he served on a Stanford-funded task-force to rewrite Antigua's banking laws -- an effort that U.S. regulators have said left major loopholes and hindered efforts to crack down on fraud. And the court-appointed receiver seeking to unravel Stanford's far-flung financial empire has demanded that the two law firms that have employed Loumiet -- who hasn't been charged with any wrongdoing -- hand over records of their work on behalf of Stanford.
As the Miami Herald reported earlier this year, the story starts in 1998, when Stanford wanted to set up an easy way to move money from SFG's Miami office, which sold certificates of deposit to investors, to Antigua, where his banking empire was headquartered.
He turned to Loumiet, at the time a lawyer at Greenberg Traurig. That's the Miami firm where Suarez, then SFG's legal counsel, had previously worked, and which would later become known as the firm from which Jack Abramoff bribed government officials. As the Herald has also reported, despite the objections of the state's top banking lawyer, Loumiet prevailed on Florida officials to allow SFG to set up a special trust office that could move money to Antigua without submitting to fraud or money -laundering checks. With the money pipeline established, the Herald reported, the Miami office sold millions in CDs over the next decade, then used jets to fly the checks, stuffed in pouches, to Antigua.
That wasn't the end of Loumiet's service to Stanford though. About a year later, the Clinton administration, as part of an effort to crack down on money laundering, was considering cutting off access to U.S. currency for all offshore institutions in Antigua.
In order to convince U.S. regulators to back off, Stanford volunteered to organize and fund a task force to re-write Antigua's banking laws -- allowing him to appoint the task force's members. Stanford named Loumiet and another Greenberg lawyer, Patrick O'Brien.
Loumiet touts the experience in the bio on his law firm website. But the revised laws that he and his fellow panelists drew up were denounced by the U.S. government as containing loopholes that made it even harder than previously for regulators to access bank records. In a letter to the Antiguan Prime Minister, the Treasury Department complained that the island nation had "weakened its anti-money laundering laws to the point they are now significantly below international standards, making Antigua more vulnerable to money laundering."
In an interview with the Washington Post at the time, Loumiet defended Stanford and suggested the U.S. and Britain did not have Antigua's best interests at heart. "Allen Stanford did not feel that if this was done with the benevolent help of the U.S. and Britain it would help Antigua," he said. "They were trying to put the fox in charge of the chicken coop, and frankly the chickens weren't very happy about it."
In any case, the panel had done its job. Stanford's operation continued largely free from regulatory scrutiny.
But Stanford still appears to have taken pains to keep Loumiet involved. When, in 2001, the lawyer moved from Greenberg to Hunton & Williams, where he remains, Stanford switched to the new firm and continued to use Loumiet as a lawyer.
That wasn't all Stanford used Loumiet's new firm for. Since 2000, Stanford Financial Group, like many large companies, had hired lobbyists to promote its interests in Washington. But, according to lobbying disclosure reports, Hunton was hired in 2005 to lobby Congress on tax issues, on behalf of Stanford personally. A spokeswoman for the firm declined to discuss what the work consisted of.
The court-appointed receiver on the Stanford case, Ralph Janvey, appears to see Loumiet's work as central to the operation. Janvey has asked both Greenberg and Hunton for files containing records of their work for Stanford. Hunton has handed over some files, but is fighting to keep others secret, citing legal issues regarding jurisdiction and client privilege.
A request to Loumiet from TPMmuckraker to discuss his work on behalf of Stanford was referred to a Hunton spokeswoman, who declined to comment.
Sunday, 9 August 2009
Florida regulators failed to stop Stanford's Miami operation
As Ecuadorean officials investigated questionable dealings from Allen Stanford's Miami office, Florida officials took no action.
Desperate to prop up Allen Stanford's financial empire, his Miami brokers jetted to South America with a sales pitch they said would deliver gold to investors: Invest in the Miami bank and reap spectacular returns.
There was just one catch: Stanford didn't have a bank in Miami.
When regulators in Ecuador caught wind of the scheme in 2005, they banned Stanford's employees from selling their prime investments and threatened legal action.
But in Florida, where Stanford's operation was rooted, regulators weren't even watching.
Florida investigators, in fact, were among the slowest in responding to the massive fraud that prosecutors say fleeced $7 billion from investors around the world -- most of the money now missing.
The crisis in Ecuador revealed major breakdowns in Florida's enforcement system at a time the Miami office was generating hundreds of millions a year for Stanford's questionable ventures, The Miami Herald found.
It exposed the office's heated campaign to recruit new clients -- and raise millions -- while breaking state banking laws.
And it shook the foundation of Stanford's financial network years before it was shut down by federal agents.
For years, brokers from the Miami office flew to Ecuador, cutting deals and sending the money to Stanford's Antiguan bank -- the records later shredded at the Miami office.
``They were breaking our laws,'' said Diego Garcés, a lead agent for the Ecuador agency that investigated the case.
The Miami center opened under a special arrangement with Florida regulators in 1998 as a foreign trust representative office -- the only one of its kind.
Because the unit was allowed to operate without any regulation -- including fraud checks -- there was no crackdown in Florida, records show.
By the time the criminal case broke open this year -- including Stanford's arrest in June -- the Miami office had generated nearly $1 billion.
Like many of Stanford's offices, the Miami center excelled in the sale of Stanford Group Company's key investment: certificates of deposit.
But to maintain the lucrative returns promised on the CDs, as much as 2 percent over competitors, Stanford needed a constant stream of money from new investors to pay off the earlier ones.
In 2005, he turned to the Miami office -- a luxury highrise adorned with expensive artwork -- to target new markets in South America.
Stanford had brokerages in South America, but there was an advantage with the Miami office: Agents promised customers the security of investing with a U.S. business.
Because Miami operated without oversight, employees were free to move in and out of countries to sell CDs without disclosing anything to regulators.
``They could do whatever they wanted to do,'' said Gonzalo Tirado, 39, president of Stanford's Venezuelan office. ``There was an astounding lack of controls.''
The sales blitz sparked cut-throat competition among the Stanford offices, prompting a flurry of angry phone calls between office managers.
``They terrorized customers,'' Tirado said. ``They told them, `Look, if you have your money in Venezuela, the government is going to know about it. If you have it in Miami, that's not going to happen.' ''
Miami brokers swept into Ecuador at least a dozen times in 2005, said Norta Llana, the Miami office administrator.
The battle with regulators in Ecuador started when officials got hold of one of Stanford's mailings. The letter not only boasted of the glowing returns on Stanford's CDs, but claimed the Miami office was a bank.
``They went crazy,'' said Steven Riger, 63, a vice president at the Miami office.
The letter said Stanford was the second largest bank in Ecuador -- a totally false claim.
Ecuador eventually banned Stanford brokers from selling CDs -- the main source of Stanford's income -- and expansion plans in Peru and Colombia were halted.
Word began to spread among regulators in other South American countries about Stanford's problems, Tirado said.
In the ensuing investigation, agents found the mailing was not only misleading, but Miami employees jetting to Ecuador were routinely breaking the law by taking deposits and leaving the country without reporting anything.
The probe sparked tense negotiations between Stanford's advisors and Ecuadorean regulators.
Riger, the former Stanford Miami executive, said several of Stanford's top brokers pleaded with him to find a way to keep the Ecuadorean business afloat.
``They were really shook up about this,'' Riger said. ``They were trying to save a book of business in Ecuador.''
While Ecuador's banking agency investigated Stanford, a second agency found the existing brokerages in Ecuador were reaping illegal commissions.
In December 2005, that agency imposed a $2,628 fine and declared most of Stanford's business practices illegal.
Garcés, the Ecuadorean agent, said Stanford's lawyers appealed the decision by the Superintendencia de Companias, but the order was upheld.
Despite the ban on CD sales, the Miami office continued to bombard residents with mailings and e-mails pushing the sales, said Santiago Noboa, a regulator who investigated Stanford.
``We couldn't stop the letters,'' he said.
In addition, the mailings -- sent to other South American countries -- spurred outrage in Stanford's foreign offices.
Tirado, who was dismissed by Stanford in a bitter employment dispute in late 2005, said he was alarmed because Miami brokers were not checking the backgrounds of customers.
He described a heated conversation with Miami office director Nelson Ramirez: ``I called Nelson and told him, `Don't do that, grow only by referral. You don't know who you're sending mail to. Be careful. If you open an account for a politically exposed person or money launderer, you will get in trouble.' ''
Ramirez did not respond to repeated requests for an interview.
Eventually, regulators let Stanford resume his business in Ecuador without further sanctions while Colombia let Stanford open his brokerage the following year.
Throughout the crisis, the company dodged U.S. regulators.
Under federal law, firms that get into trouble selling securities overseas must report the problems on their regulatory records. But Stanford's brokerage failed to disclose the crackdown, and the Miami office -- running without any regulatory controls -- did not have to file anything. ``It was a black hole,'' said Mark Raymond, a Miami lawyer representing investors.
Several securities lawyers said such disclosures often spark investigations by regulators in this country.
But nothing happened in Florida.
Linda Charity, acting commissioner of Florida's Office of Financial Regulation, said the state's authority was restricted by the agreement it struck with Stanford a decade ago. ``We really couldn't do anything,'' she said.
But under the law, state agents are empowered to probe any company they believe is violating banking and securities statutes.
During a key visit by Florida examiners in 2005 -- while Stanford was under investigation in Ecuador -- agents found employees shipping checks to Antigua, marked as deposits, and shredding the records left behind. No investigations were launched.
Under Florida statute 655, only licensed companies can take deposits, and anyone violating the law is subject to a felony charge.
``The state had the right to go in there,'' Raymond said. ``As soon as it saw what was going on, it should have issued a subpoena.''
Charity said the state began probing the office after a 2007 visit turned up ``red flags,'' but her agency took no enforcement action. She declined to give details of the visit.
Jonathan Winer, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state, said the breakdowns began when Florida struck the deal with Stanford in 1998.
Once in charge of money laundering investigations in the Caribbean, Winer said he remembers when the agreement was reached.
``At the time, I was totally perplexed. I wasn't in the business of questioning state regulators. I presumed they knew what they were doing,'' he said. ``I am disgusted that the state of Florida let this happen.''
Raymond said the events in Ecuador offer a stark contrast in regulatory actions. ``Their regulators did what we didn't do,'' he said. ``We supposedly are the gem of banking regulatory systems, but in the end, we dropped the ball.''
Desperate to prop up Allen Stanford's financial empire, his Miami brokers jetted to South America with a sales pitch they said would deliver gold to investors: Invest in the Miami bank and reap spectacular returns.
There was just one catch: Stanford didn't have a bank in Miami.
When regulators in Ecuador caught wind of the scheme in 2005, they banned Stanford's employees from selling their prime investments and threatened legal action.
But in Florida, where Stanford's operation was rooted, regulators weren't even watching.
Florida investigators, in fact, were among the slowest in responding to the massive fraud that prosecutors say fleeced $7 billion from investors around the world -- most of the money now missing.
The crisis in Ecuador revealed major breakdowns in Florida's enforcement system at a time the Miami office was generating hundreds of millions a year for Stanford's questionable ventures, The Miami Herald found.
It exposed the office's heated campaign to recruit new clients -- and raise millions -- while breaking state banking laws.
And it shook the foundation of Stanford's financial network years before it was shut down by federal agents.
For years, brokers from the Miami office flew to Ecuador, cutting deals and sending the money to Stanford's Antiguan bank -- the records later shredded at the Miami office.
``They were breaking our laws,'' said Diego Garcés, a lead agent for the Ecuador agency that investigated the case.
The Miami center opened under a special arrangement with Florida regulators in 1998 as a foreign trust representative office -- the only one of its kind.
Because the unit was allowed to operate without any regulation -- including fraud checks -- there was no crackdown in Florida, records show.
By the time the criminal case broke open this year -- including Stanford's arrest in June -- the Miami office had generated nearly $1 billion.
Like many of Stanford's offices, the Miami center excelled in the sale of Stanford Group Company's key investment: certificates of deposit.
But to maintain the lucrative returns promised on the CDs, as much as 2 percent over competitors, Stanford needed a constant stream of money from new investors to pay off the earlier ones.
In 2005, he turned to the Miami office -- a luxury highrise adorned with expensive artwork -- to target new markets in South America.
Stanford had brokerages in South America, but there was an advantage with the Miami office: Agents promised customers the security of investing with a U.S. business.
Because Miami operated without oversight, employees were free to move in and out of countries to sell CDs without disclosing anything to regulators.
``They could do whatever they wanted to do,'' said Gonzalo Tirado, 39, president of Stanford's Venezuelan office. ``There was an astounding lack of controls.''
The sales blitz sparked cut-throat competition among the Stanford offices, prompting a flurry of angry phone calls between office managers.
``They terrorized customers,'' Tirado said. ``They told them, `Look, if you have your money in Venezuela, the government is going to know about it. If you have it in Miami, that's not going to happen.' ''
Miami brokers swept into Ecuador at least a dozen times in 2005, said Norta Llana, the Miami office administrator.
The battle with regulators in Ecuador started when officials got hold of one of Stanford's mailings. The letter not only boasted of the glowing returns on Stanford's CDs, but claimed the Miami office was a bank.
``They went crazy,'' said Steven Riger, 63, a vice president at the Miami office.
The letter said Stanford was the second largest bank in Ecuador -- a totally false claim.
Ecuador eventually banned Stanford brokers from selling CDs -- the main source of Stanford's income -- and expansion plans in Peru and Colombia were halted.
Word began to spread among regulators in other South American countries about Stanford's problems, Tirado said.
In the ensuing investigation, agents found the mailing was not only misleading, but Miami employees jetting to Ecuador were routinely breaking the law by taking deposits and leaving the country without reporting anything.
The probe sparked tense negotiations between Stanford's advisors and Ecuadorean regulators.
Riger, the former Stanford Miami executive, said several of Stanford's top brokers pleaded with him to find a way to keep the Ecuadorean business afloat.
``They were really shook up about this,'' Riger said. ``They were trying to save a book of business in Ecuador.''
While Ecuador's banking agency investigated Stanford, a second agency found the existing brokerages in Ecuador were reaping illegal commissions.
In December 2005, that agency imposed a $2,628 fine and declared most of Stanford's business practices illegal.
Garcés, the Ecuadorean agent, said Stanford's lawyers appealed the decision by the Superintendencia de Companias, but the order was upheld.
Despite the ban on CD sales, the Miami office continued to bombard residents with mailings and e-mails pushing the sales, said Santiago Noboa, a regulator who investigated Stanford.
``We couldn't stop the letters,'' he said.
In addition, the mailings -- sent to other South American countries -- spurred outrage in Stanford's foreign offices.
Tirado, who was dismissed by Stanford in a bitter employment dispute in late 2005, said he was alarmed because Miami brokers were not checking the backgrounds of customers.
He described a heated conversation with Miami office director Nelson Ramirez: ``I called Nelson and told him, `Don't do that, grow only by referral. You don't know who you're sending mail to. Be careful. If you open an account for a politically exposed person or money launderer, you will get in trouble.' ''
Ramirez did not respond to repeated requests for an interview.
Eventually, regulators let Stanford resume his business in Ecuador without further sanctions while Colombia let Stanford open his brokerage the following year.
Throughout the crisis, the company dodged U.S. regulators.
Under federal law, firms that get into trouble selling securities overseas must report the problems on their regulatory records. But Stanford's brokerage failed to disclose the crackdown, and the Miami office -- running without any regulatory controls -- did not have to file anything. ``It was a black hole,'' said Mark Raymond, a Miami lawyer representing investors.
Several securities lawyers said such disclosures often spark investigations by regulators in this country.
But nothing happened in Florida.
Linda Charity, acting commissioner of Florida's Office of Financial Regulation, said the state's authority was restricted by the agreement it struck with Stanford a decade ago. ``We really couldn't do anything,'' she said.
But under the law, state agents are empowered to probe any company they believe is violating banking and securities statutes.
During a key visit by Florida examiners in 2005 -- while Stanford was under investigation in Ecuador -- agents found employees shipping checks to Antigua, marked as deposits, and shredding the records left behind. No investigations were launched.
Under Florida statute 655, only licensed companies can take deposits, and anyone violating the law is subject to a felony charge.
``The state had the right to go in there,'' Raymond said. ``As soon as it saw what was going on, it should have issued a subpoena.''
Charity said the state began probing the office after a 2007 visit turned up ``red flags,'' but her agency took no enforcement action. She declined to give details of the visit.
Jonathan Winer, a former U.S. deputy assistant secretary of state, said the breakdowns began when Florida struck the deal with Stanford in 1998.
Once in charge of money laundering investigations in the Caribbean, Winer said he remembers when the agreement was reached.
``At the time, I was totally perplexed. I wasn't in the business of questioning state regulators. I presumed they knew what they were doing,'' he said. ``I am disgusted that the state of Florida let this happen.''
Raymond said the events in Ecuador offer a stark contrast in regulatory actions. ``Their regulators did what we didn't do,'' he said. ``We supposedly are the gem of banking regulatory systems, but in the end, we dropped the ball.''
Saturday, 25 July 2009
Stanford’s Shredded Florida Papers Being Reassembled
Shredded documents seized from R. Allen Stanford’s South Florida offices are being pieced back together by prosecutors probing allegations the Texas financier ran a $7 billion Ponzi scheme.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Barry Seltzer of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, said federal prosecutors told him yesterday that within the next two months they will have “re-assembled the contents of three bags of shredded documents,” according to a report posted today on the court’s Web site.
The shredded evidence will initially be used against Bruce Perraud, a former Stanford Financial Group security specialist who is charged with destroying documents after an investigation began. Perraud’s trial date, set for Aug. 24, will probably change to accommodate his lawyer’s vacation plans, Seltzer said.
Stanford, four of his executives and Antigua’s former top banking regulator are charged with defrauding investors of as much as $7 billion through bogus certificates of deposit sold by Antigua-based Stanford International Bank. The charges mirror U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission civil claims filed against Stanford and three of his companies on Feb. 17.
Perraud, who isn’t accused of participating in the alleged fraud, worked at Stanford’s Fort Lauderdale office, according to an indictment unsealed in June. Prosecutors claim Perraud told a document-shredding company to destroy a 95-gallon bin full of papers on Feb. 25, a week after a Texas judge presiding over the SEC case issued an order forbidding the alteration, removal or destruction of Stanford Financial records.
Edward Shohat, Perraud’s lawyer, said in a July 22 telephone interview that his client intends to fight the charge.
Prosecutors told Seltzer that, in addition to the reassembled shredded documents, they intend to use six seized computer hard drives as evidence against Perraud.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Barry Seltzer of Fort Lauderdale, Florida, said federal prosecutors told him yesterday that within the next two months they will have “re-assembled the contents of three bags of shredded documents,” according to a report posted today on the court’s Web site.
The shredded evidence will initially be used against Bruce Perraud, a former Stanford Financial Group security specialist who is charged with destroying documents after an investigation began. Perraud’s trial date, set for Aug. 24, will probably change to accommodate his lawyer’s vacation plans, Seltzer said.
Stanford, four of his executives and Antigua’s former top banking regulator are charged with defrauding investors of as much as $7 billion through bogus certificates of deposit sold by Antigua-based Stanford International Bank. The charges mirror U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission civil claims filed against Stanford and three of his companies on Feb. 17.
Perraud, who isn’t accused of participating in the alleged fraud, worked at Stanford’s Fort Lauderdale office, according to an indictment unsealed in June. Prosecutors claim Perraud told a document-shredding company to destroy a 95-gallon bin full of papers on Feb. 25, a week after a Texas judge presiding over the SEC case issued an order forbidding the alteration, removal or destruction of Stanford Financial records.
Edward Shohat, Perraud’s lawyer, said in a July 22 telephone interview that his client intends to fight the charge.
Prosecutors told Seltzer that, in addition to the reassembled shredded documents, they intend to use six seized computer hard drives as evidence against Perraud.